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I. INTRODUCTION
"He's been stabbed." Her voice sounded weak and distraught over the
phone. "Please send help. My husband is dying." On the other side of the
call, the Los Angeles Police Department responded immediately. Minutes
later, two patrol cars screeched into a grocery store parking lot to find a
small crowd gathering around a white SUV in the 11:00 p.m. darkness.
A woman kneeled on the ground, sobbing and clutching her stomach.
She was covered from head to toe in loose black cloth, with a veil cast over
her face. Sprawled next to her, a man lay facedown in a pool of blood. He
did not move.
A small group of spectators stood nearby, horrified. One of the officers
immediately attempted to calm the sobbing woman, but as he did so she
spun around wildly, as if her life was still in danger. Her eyes dashed from
person to person, until finally they found their target. Frantically, she
extended a trembling finger in the direction of a middle-aged man standing
in the center of the crowd.
"Him! It was him! That man killed my husband!"
Silence filled the courtroom. It seemed like just yesterday Fatima
Hassan had pointed her finger in that parking lot. Yet here Brian Taylor
found himself sitting in the defendant's chair facing murder charges. Here
he found himself waiting for Hassan to take the witness stand. All because
he ended up on the other side of that finger.
Upon entering the courtroom, she appeared the same way she did on that
fateful night-the black garment draped over her body and the veil pulled
tightly over her face, covering all but her wandering eyes. She would be the
first witness and the last witness. No one else had seen anything. No other
evidence existed. No fingerprints, no weapon. It was his word against hers.
Taylor nudged his attorney. "She can't wear that up there. Make her
take it off." He didn't know why, but the thought of Hassan testifying in the
veil made him uncomfortable.
Taylor's attorney pleaded for the veil's removal, but before the judge
could even respond, Hassan's voice penetrated the room. "I'd rather die.
You already took my husband. You will not take my dignity." Despite
Taylor's arguing and the judge's requests, Hassan would not budge. She
pulled her garments tighter. Steadily the judge's sympathy grew, and finally
he relented. Hassan, cloaked in black, took the stand. Her religion was
honored. Reluctantly, Taylor braced for trial.'
1. This is a fictional story created by the author.
824
[Vol. 36: 823, 2009] Confronting the Shadow
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
For criminal defendants like Brian Taylor, a single witness's testimony
can be life altering.2 It is for this very reason that the American criminal
justice system puts so much emphasis on the jury's ability to evaluate the
reliability of witness testimony. It is also for this reason that criminal
defendants like Brian Taylor have good cause for concern when a veiled
witness testifies against him in court.4 As the jury attempts to evaluate the
witness's credibility, what might the veil conceal? A vindictive smile? A
twitch of the mouth? A forehead dotted with beads of sweat?5  The
2. The two most dramatic consequences of a criminal conviction are the defendant's loss of
liberty and the "criminal stigma" attached to the defendant's name. See Margaret H. Lemos, The
Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of
Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1228 (2006). These consequences are "typically much worse
than those that follow from an unfavorable verdict in a civil case. Given the significance of those
consequences our society has made a 'fundamental value determination' . . . that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). As a recent article describes:
The label of "convicted felon" strips an individual of the right to vote, serve on juries,
own firearms, or hold public office. In many states, convicted felons are prohibited from
obtaining student loans, employment in state-licensed occupations, or employment with
state-licensed companies. In addition, the label of convicted felon may contribute to
various informal exclusions that can make access to noncriminal activities more difficult
and criminal alternatives more attractive.
Ted Chiricos, Kelle Barrick, William Bales & Stephanie Bontrager, The Labeling of Convicted
Felons and Its Consequences for Recidivism, CRIMINOLOGY, Aug. 1, 2007, at 548 available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/I 17996466/PDFSTART?CRETRY=I&SRETR
Y=0 (also revealing a study that shows the "criminal" label may actually contribute to subsequent
criminal recidivism). Heightened concern arises when the jury bases a conviction on the testimony
of only very few witnesses or even a single witness. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 542 n.30
(2000) (noting that "[o]ne single Witness, if credited by Twelve Jury-men, is sufficient" to convict a
defendant of a crime).
3. The U.S. Supreme Court has described the jury's ability to make credibility determinations as
"[a] fundamental premise of our criminal trial system." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313
(1998). The jury serves as a "lie detector," and this function has "long been held to be the part of
every case [that] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence
and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
4. "The jury's inability to see the entire witness may limit its ability to evaluate that witness'
credibility and value as evidence," which may impair "an important function of the jury in criminal
trials." Anthony Garofano, Avoiding Virtual Justice: Video-Teleconference Testimony in Federal
Criminal Trials, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 702 (2007) (emphasis added). As a result, the U.S.
Supreme Court has "noted the fundamental importance of avoiding the wrongful implication of
defendants by witnesses and the efficacy of face-to-face confrontation in achieving this." Id.
5. These aspects of a witness's testimony are described as "demeanor evidence," which refers to
outward appearances such as facial expressions, gestures, tone of voice, and hesitation or readiness
to answer questions. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 463 (8th ed. 2004). "Under our common law
system of litigation, the trier of fact uses the witness's demeanor to determine the truth of the
testimony." James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 904 (2000). The use
of demeanor evidence has long existed as an integral part of our legal system:
For hundreds of years, judges or juries have decided the credibility of testimony on the
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defendant may also raise concerns over his counsel's ability to effectively
read the veiled witness's expressions and mannerisms during cross-
examination.6 Still, even putting these legal technicalities aside, the
defendant may just want the opportunity to stare at his accuser face-to-face
as his liberty hangs in the balance.7 Whether it is for one or all of the above
reasons, the criminal defendant will likely demand the witness to unveil.8
This demand has constitutional backing, as the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause expressly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
"confront" those witnesses against him.9
demeanor of the witness, including the witness's appearance, attitude, and manner. The
process is subjective and difficult to describe. Jurors usually do not have to elucidate
the reasons for their verdict, but the trial judge who specifies a negative physical
characteristic of the witness's demeanor risks reversal on appeal.
Id. at 904-05. Recent empirical studies are beginning to suggest that our legal system should
become less reliant on such evidence. Id. at 905. For a discussion on the value of demeanor
evidence in trial and how the Muslim veil affects this evidence, see infra notes 207-29 and
accompanying text.
6. The jurors aren't the only people in the courtroom who need to assess an adversarial
witness's demeanor. During trial, the defense counsel uses a witness's demeanor to conduct
effective cross-examination, "an integral part of [the] system in order to penetrate all of the
conflicting impulses or obstacles to lay bare the whole truth." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 491 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2004) (quoting
Degelos v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 313 F.2d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1963)). Due to the unpredictable
nature of cross-examination, it is impossible for an attorney to fully prepare himself for the
questioning. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 251 (Aspen Publishers 7th ed. 2007)
("Copying a model cross-examination from a 'how to' text rarely helps, because every witness, in
the context of a particular trial, is unique and must be treated as such."). As a result, it is
recommended that trial attorneys pay close attention to the witness's demeanor:
Witnesses constantly surprise you. Unless you are watching and listening, you will miss
nuances and gradations in the witness' testimony. Reluctance and hesitation in
answering will be overlooked. Don't bury your face in your notes, worrying about the
next questions while the witness is answering the last one .... This way you can watch
the witness as he listens and answers, gauge the witness' reaction to your question and
the tone of his answer, and intelligently formulate follow-up questions.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant will likely raise objections when his counsel is
unable to fully read the veiled witness's demeanor.
7. The U.S. Supreme Court has examined the importance of "face-to-face" confrontation, often
supported by historical references dating back to the time of the ancient Romans. See Coy v. Iowa,
487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988). Part III of this Comment takes a detailed look at the right of"face-
to-face" confrontation and its role in American jurisprudence. See infra notes 84-157 and
accompanying text.
8. However warranted, this demand to unveil may unfortunately be presented in a harsh and
unjustified manner. For example, in a New Zealand criminal case where two women attempted to
testify while wearing their veils, the opposing counsel engaged in "an attack on Islamic
fundamentalism by reference to terrorist activities." Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005
N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3, *55 (D.C. Jan. 14, 2005). The judge in that case described the defense
submissions as "extravagant, and often needlessly offensive in both scope and expression." Id. at
*64. Even though this dialogue occurred in another country, American courts will likely face similar
discriminatory remarks in trials that involve veiled witnesses. It is for this reason that American
courts must be cautious when dealing with such a controversial and sensitive issue.
9. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant shall "enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This part of the Sixth
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Yet Muslim women like Fatima Hassan may also demand constitutional
protection in an effort to protect their free exercise of religion.'
° Given
America's heavy emphasis on individual rights," this argument is not
surprising, nor is it trivial.' 2 The witness may also argue that the veil in no
way abridges the defendant's right to physically confront her, and that there
is no valid reason to unveil in trial because the Confrontation Clause is not
implicated.' 3  American criminal courts must therefore deal with both
challenging constitutional interpretations and a clash of constitutional
interests when a Muslim witness demands the court to respect her religion.
Amendment has come to be known as the "Confrontation Clause." See infra note 85. With a history
"trac[ing] back to the beginnings of Western legal culture," the true meaning and proper
interpretation of the Clause has been challenging for the Supreme Court. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015;
see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the
Confrontation Clause as "com[ing] to us on faded parchment"); Cornelius M. Murphy, Justice Scalia
and the Confrontation Clause: A Case Study in Originalist Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1243, 1244 (1997) (describing Confrontation Clause history as "unclear").
When looking to see whether a Muslim woman's veil interferes with this right, the analysis becomes
even more difficult because much of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause precedent deals with
hearsay issues and restrictions on the scope of cross-examination, rather than the defendant's literal
right to "face" his accusers. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Yet the Confrontation
Clause still governs this legal question and is the defendant's strongest weapon against veiled
testimony.
10. Such a demand would be made under the First Amendment, which guarantees that "Congress
shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment therefore prohibits the government from making any rules or laws that interfere with or
attempt to regulate any citizen's religious beliefs or practices. See generally Karl A. Menninger, 63
AM. JR. 3D Proof of Facts § 195 (2001). Because certain Muslim women consider the veil to be a
religious obligation, a court ruling that forces a witness to unveil in trial can arguably be seen as an
abridgment of First Amendment rights. See infra notes 247-85 and accompanying text.
I1. Embedded in our nation's history are struggles over such issues as freedom of speech,
association and assembly, freedom of the press, equal treatment regardless of race, sex, religion, or
national origin, due process rights, and rights to privacy. See generally American Civil Liberties
Union, http://www.aclu.org/about/index.html. Free exercise of religion is a debate that continues
today. For a forward-looking discussion of the interplay between religion and the law, see generally
Claire McCusker, When Church and State Collide: Averting Democratic Disaffection in a Post-
Smith World, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 391 (2007).
12. "The Constitution places beyond the reach of the law the affirmative pursuit of one's
convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and humanity's relation to it." 16A AM. JUR.
2D Constitutional Law § 424 (1998). "The Free Exercise Clause withdraws from legislative power,
both state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion." Id.
13. The Muslim witness may argue that the Confrontation Clause only requires her to be
physically present in the courtroom, and nothing more. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying
text. The witness may also argue that the veil in no way prevents the jury or defense counsel from
properly evaluating her testimony in trial. See infra note 218-29 and accompanying text. Further,
the witness may argue that various policy reasons exist for preventing the Confrontation Clause from
unveiling her in trial. See infra notes 230-45 and accompanying text.
The truth is, no American criminal case has ever dealt with this preciseissue. 14  While similar cases have arisen in this country" and abroad, 6
nothing on the books is binding in the situation where a veiled Muslim
woman testifies against a criminal defendant. Unsettling as this may be, the
good news is that the United States Supreme Court has already laid out all of
the rules necessary to formulate an answer. 17 Yet in reaching that answer
we tread on fragile grounds. The inevitable clash still remains: on one side
we may have a Muslim woman who would rather sacrifice her liberty than
remove her veil,' 8 while on the other we have a defendant who deserves the
constitutional protection that this country's laws guarantee. This Comment
will analyze the veiled witness's effect on the criminal defendant's right to
confrontation and will ultimately argue that such veiled testimony violates
the Confrontation Clause. 19
Part II will give the reader a general overview of Islam and its followers,
describe the history and purposes of the veil, and discuss the veil's current
impact in America and worldwide. 0 Part III will examine the Confrontation
14. In no recorded American case has a criminal defendant brought a Confrontation Clause claim
as a result of a Muslim woman's veiled testimony.
15. In America at least one Muslim woman has refused to unveil in a Michigan small claims
court. See Muhammad v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car, No. 06-41896-GC (Mich. 31st Dist. Ct. Oct. 11,2006). In Florida, a Muslim woman refused to remove her veil in a driver's license photo and a
court of appeal upheld the state's decision denying issuance. See Freeman v. Dep't of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
16. In countries around the world, courts and legislatures have placed certain bans on Muslim
veils. For example, the Dutch government recently implemented a "total ban" of face veils in
public. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. The Italian government has also forbidden women
to wear the veil in public. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. And in New Zealand, a
criminal court was recently faced with two Muslim witnesses who refused to remove their veils in
trial. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
17. These rules have arisen out of American cases where witnesses somehow attempt to shield
themselves from the view of the defendant. See infra notes 96-157 and accompanying text. For
example, some of the most prominent Confrontation Clause cases that deal with "face-to-face"
confrontation involve child sexual abuse cases. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988);
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). In these cases the child witness is removed from the
defendant's view through such means as a screen or a closed-circuit television, which has resulted inSixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation claims. See Coy, 487 U.S. 1012; Craig, 497 U.S.
836. Other cases involve witnesses who wear "disguises" on the witness stand in order to prevent
the defendant from learning their identity. See Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002); see
also People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Although these lines of precedent do not directly deal with the issue athand, they involve the same rules that a court would use to analyze a case involving a veiled witness.
See infra notes 96-157 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 168-246 and accompanying text. This Comment will strive to take a
thoughtful and open-minded approach. Absent thoughtful discussion, it is too easy for a non-
Muslim-American to simply say, "Remove your veil." While it is true we can only do so much toplace ourselves in the shoes of another, it is necessary to first fully attempt to understand the
importance of the veil to certain Muslim women. Once that is accomplished, the law can be applied
in a less-biased fashion, and we can reach an answer rooted more in justice than in discrimination.
20. See infra notes 26-83 and accompanying text.
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Clause, its history, and key decisions that have contributed to its
development.21  Part IV will address the question of whether the
Confrontation Clause is violated when a veiled witness testifies against a
criminal defendant.22 Part V will discuss First Amendment concerns that
arise when a Muslim woman is forced to unveil.23 Part VI will offer some
possible methods of reducing the intrusion caused by unveiling,24 and part
VII will conclude the Comment. 25
II. THE "VEIL
' 26
A recent dialogue between a Michigan district court judge and a woman
by the name of Ginnnah Muhammad illustrates the potential clash between
courtroom procedure and a Muslim woman's demand to wear her veil:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, first of all tell me what you
wish to do.
MUHAMMAD: I wish to respect my religion and so I will
not take off my clothes.
THE COURT: Well, it's not taking off your clothes. All I
am trying to do is ask you to take off the part that's
covering your face so I can see your face and I can hear
you and listen to you when you testify, and then you can
put the veil back on. That's all I am asking [you] to do,
ma'am.
21. See infra notes 84-167 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 168-245 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 246-85 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 288-99 and accompanying text.
26. The word "veil" is not technically accurate in describing all forms of face-coverings worn by
Muslim women, as there are many differing varieties with different specific names. See infra note
53. As one author describes:
All [the] complexity reflected and expressed in the [Arabic] language is referred to by the
single convenient Western term "veil," which is indiscriminate, monolithic, and
ambiguous. The absence of a single, monolithic term in the language(s) of the people
who at present most visibly practice "veiling" suggests a significance to this diversity that
cannot be captured in one term. By subsuming and transcending such multivocality and
complexity we lose the nuanced difference in meaning and associated cultural behaviors.
FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE 7 (Joanne B. Eicher ed., Berg
2000) (1999). While it is important to keep this diversity in mind, this Comment is not designed to
delve deeply into such nuances. Therefore, for the purposes of this section the word "veil" will be
used to encompass all types of face-coverings worn by Muslim women. For a detailed discussion of
the veil's many different nuances, see generally id. at 3-160.
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MUHAMMAD: Well, Your Honor, with all due respect,
this is part of my clothes, so I can't remove my clothing
when I'm in Court .... I'm a practicing Muslim and this is
my way of life ... 27
This dialogue reveals the potential lack of understanding between
American courts and Muslim witnesses, especially when it comes to the
veil.28 It also indicates that, before engaging in a meaningful discussion of
the "veil" and its place in the American criminal courtroom, it is necessary
to gain a basic understanding of Islam and its followers. This section will
thus offer a general overview of the Islamic religion and culture, the origins
and differing uses of the veil, and how the world is currently responding to
the veil.
A. Understanding Islam and its Followers
Islam 29 is a religion that stretches across the globe. With roughly one
billion Muslim 30 followers,3' it currently stands as the second largest
27. Transcript of Record at 4, 6, Muhammad v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, No. 06-41896 (Mich.
31st Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Transcript of Record]. The judge dismissed Ginnnah
Muhammad's case after she refused to remove her veil. Id. at 6; see infra note 72 and accompanying
text.
28. As a recent article describes:
[T]hose who drafted the rules governing... [the] courtroom would never have thought to
consider a face-covering "clothes" in the same sense that a skirt and blouse are "clothes,"
while to Muhammad this was a natural use of the word and the concept. From this
difference in background assumptions arose [as to] Muhammad's conflict.
McCusker, supra note 11, at 396. When Muhammad declared that her veil was "a religious thing,"
the judge directly countered by saying, "I think it's a custom thing." Transcript of Record, supra
note 27, at 4. The judge even admitted that he had "no clue about any of this information," to which
Muhammad responded, "That's what I'm saying." Id.
29. The word "Islam" means "submission" or "peace." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 144
(John L. Esposito ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF ISLAM].
30. DAVID WAINES, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM I (Cambridge University Press 2003) (1995).
Due to the existing "variety of Muslim peoples and cultures," there is a wide range of "ethnic,
linguistic, and geographical diversity among [them]." Id. at 2. Yet, similar to Christians, Muslims
belong to a "world-wide community." Id. This has been described as a "trans-national and cross-
cultural loyalty shared by Muslims everywhere." Id.
3 1. Id. (this estimate is based on data available in 2003). It is important to note, however, that
some sources have criticized the reliability of private surveys that provide these numbers. See
generally Teresa Watanabe, Private Studies Fuel Debate Over Size of U.S. Muslim Population, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/headlines/20011028usmuslimsnat
7p7.asp. In regard to United States statistics, there is no official count of Muslims or a number
commonly accepted by those who study the question. Jane I. Smith, Patterns of Muslim
Immigration, Oct. 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslimlife/immigrat.htm. This is
largely because the U.S. Census Bureau does not collect or release figures for religious affiliation,
due to the separation of church and state. Id. As a result, the estimated figures widely range from
two million to as many as seven million. Id. However, it is possible to evaluate the level of Muslim
immigration into the United States. See Andrea Elliott, Muslim Immigration Has Bounced Back,
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religious community in the world.32 Islam is a monotheistic faith,33 with its
center and foundation being God, or Allah.34  Muslims believe that in the
seventh century Allah revealed a divine message to the Prophet
Muhammad,35 which is recorded verbatim in the Qur'an and forms their
scripture.36 In this "divine message," Allah directly proclaimed the "happy
consequences of worshiping and following him."'37 The Qur'an is therefore
regarded as the ultimate authority in all matters pertaining to the Islamic
religion.38
Muslim believers are also guided by their desire to emulate the prophet
Muhammad, whose words and actions have served as the "ideal model. 39
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/
2003252072 91 lmuslimsl0.html. According to statistics gathered by the Department of Homeland
Security and the U.S. Census Bureau, "Muslims appear to be moving here again in surprising
numbers." Id. As the statistics reveal:
In 2005, more people from Muslim countries became legal permanent U.S. residents-
nearly 96,000-than in any year in the previous two decades. More than 40,000 of them
were admitted last year, the highest annual number since the terrorist attacks, according
to data on 22 countries provided by the Department of Homeland Security.
Id. These Muslims have come to America "seeking the same promise that has drawn
foreigners.., for many decades, according to a range of experts and immigrants: economic
opportunity and political freedom." Id.
32. See WAINES, supra note 30, at 1. Though many regard the Arab world as the "heartland of
Islam," the majority of Muslims live in Asia and Africa. DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at
144. The largest Muslim communities can be found in "Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India,
Central Asia, and Nigeria." Id. Islam is second to Christianity in terms of the largest religious
community in the world. Id.
33. DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 144. "Monotheism" is the belief that there is only
one God. Id. In fact, Muslims believe that Islam was "the original monotheistic faith," with
Judaism and Christianity as "tolerated offshoots." Id.
34. Id. Muslims believe Allah is the "transcendent, all-powerful, and all-knowing creator,
sustainer, ordainer, and judge of the universe." Id. Allah is "not only powerful and majestic, but
also merciful and just." Id.
35. Allah's message was revealed through the archangel Gabriel. S.A. NIGOSIAN, ISLAM: ITS
HISTORY, TEACHING, AND PRACTICES 65 (Ind. Univ. Press 2004). Thus, the Qur'an is considered to
be the "infallible message or speech of God." Id.
36. DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 144. Besides the Qur'an, Muslims believe four
other "Holy Books" were periodically sent down by Allah to different prophets: Abraham, Moses,
David, and Jesus. NIGOSIAN, supra note 35, at 65. However, each book was "adulterated by human
imperfections." Id. Muslims believe that the Qur'an sets right the imperfections in all the other
books, and therefore that it is "the perfection and culmination of all truth." Id.
37. Id.
38. DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 256. The Qur'an "furnishes the basic tenets of the
faith, the principles of ethical behavior, and guidance for social, political, and economic activities."
Id.
39. NIGOSIAN, supra note 35, at 80. "[T]he actions, decisions, and practices that Muhammad
approved, allowed, or condoned, as well as those he refrained from or disapproved of, are used by
Muslims as examples for guidance in all aspects of life." Id. The Islamic word for Muhammad's
As a result, Muhammad's words and actions were compiled and recorded
into a literary source called the Hadith.40 Using the Hadith as a guide,
Muslims model their daily lives after their prophet Muhammad. 4' Thus, for
Muslims, the Hadith is the most important literary material next to the
Qur'an.4 2
Overall, the Qur'an and the Hadith form the source material of Islamic
law,43 and together they outline the fundamental principles that regulate a
Muslim's "full range of human activities in both the public and private
spheres." 44 It follows, then, that these sources of law address the social and
religious regulations pertaining to Muslim women. 45 These include issues
such as marriage, inheritance, gender roles, and dress codes. 46 Socially and
economically Islam has traditionally favored men, but debates over Muslim
women's rights and status have emerged.47 Included in those debates is the
practice of veiling, and its corresponding history, purpose, and meaning.48
words and actions is Sunnah. Id.
40. See id. at 80. "The literature of the Hadith includes the earliest biography of the prophet
Muhammad, an account of the founding of the community, a portrait of Muhammad as founder andlegislator of the community, and of Muhammad as the model and guide for Muslims." Id. The
collections of the Hadith deal with everyday problems, in the areas of "social, political, economic,
and domestic life." Id.
41. Id. Muslims have modeled their lives after the prophet Muhammad for more than thirteen
hundred years:
They awaken every morning as he awakened; they eat as he ate; they wash as he washed;
and they behave even in the minutest acts of daily life as he behaved. The presence of
the Prophet is felt, as it were, in a tangible way, as much through the Hadith as through
the Qur'an.
Id. at 81.
42. Id. at 80.
43. This Islamic law is called Shari'ah, which is defined as "God's eternal and immutable will
for humanity, as expressed in the Qur'an and Muhammed's example (Sunnah), considered binding
for all believers; ideal Islamic law." DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 288. Islamic lawdiffers from Western legal systems in two major ways: its scope and its value. NIGOSIAN, supra
note 35, at 85. First, Western systems of law "govern one's relationship to the state and to fellow
beings," while Islamic law "regulates one's relationship with God and conscience, in addition to the
state and to fellow beings. Id. Second, Western legal systems "adapt to the changing circumstances
of contemporary society," while Islamic law is imposed by Allah on society and does not change.
Id. at 85-86.
44. Cynthia DeBula Baines, Note, L 'Affaire des Foulards-Discrimination, or the Price of aSecular Public Education System?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 309 (1996). For example,
polygamy is strictly regulated, incest is absolutely forbidden, and drinking alcohol or gambling isforbidden. NIGOSIAN, supra note 35, at 72. "Law rather than theology is the central religiousdiscipline and locus for defining the path of Islam." DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 144.
45. NIGOSIAN, supra note 35, at 90.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 91. "Millions of Muslim women around the world have formed various groups,
leagues, associations, and organizations to modify the existing gender inequities." Id. "Those[women] who support reform are called 'modernists,' 'reformists,' 'liberals,' or 'secularists."' Id.
Those who oppose the reform "are known as 'conservatives,' 'fundamentalists,' 'scripturalists,' or
'Islamists."' Id.
48. Id.
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B. Islam and the Veil
The custom of veiling existed prior to Islam, and therefore did not
originate within the Islamic religion or culture.49  Although history is
unclear as to exactly how the practice of veiling was introduced to
Muslims, 50 it is clear that Islamic veiling evolved its own distinct function,
characteristics, and meaning. 5
Both Muslim men and women are required to dress modestly, with the
dress code conforming to a general understanding of the Hadith and
tradition.52 Yet only Muslim women wear the veil, which comes in a variety
of forms and is described by a variety of terms." To support the practice of
veiling, passages from both the Hadith14 and the Qur'an5' have been
49. EL GUINDI, supra note 26, at 149. Veiling existed for both men and women "in Hellenic,
Judaic, Byzantine, and Balkan cultures." Id. In some of these cultures, the veil was a sign of high
status. DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 112.
50. Possibilities include "adoption, reinvention, or independent invention." EL GUINDI, supra
note 26, at 149.
51. Id.
52. Muslim Women, Dress Codes and Human Rights: An Introduction to Some of the Issues,
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N 2 (2005), available at http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/newsandissues/
muslimwomendresscodesandhumanrights.php.
53. In Arabic, the veil is generally referred to as the hijab, which means a "[t]raditional Muslim
women's head, face, or body covering." DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 29, at 112. There are
various forms of the hijab, ranging from the headscarf, "the long rectangular scarf or shayla worn
widely in the Gulf states, the waist-length cape or khimar," the Iranian head-to-toe covering called
the chador, to the most concealing Muslim veil, the burqa, which covers the entire face and body.
Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3, *17-18 (D.C. Jan. 14, 2005),
This article is only concerned with those veils that cover significant portions of the woman's face, as
the others do not raise any Confrontation Clause issues.
54. The follow passage appears in the Hadith: "And as regards the (verse of) the veiling of the
women, I said, '0 Allah's Apostle, I wish you ordered your wives to cover themselves from the men
because good and bad ones talk to them."' Id. at *19.
55. Qur'an, Sura 33:59 says: "0 Prophet, tell your wives and daughters, and the women of the
believers to bring down over themselves part of their outer garments. That is the more suitable that
they will be known and not be abused. And ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful." Id. at *18
(parenthetical omitted). Another passage, Qur'an, Sura 24:31 says:
And tell the believing women to reduce their vision and guard their private parts, and not
expose their adornment except that which is apparent; and let them wrap their covers over
their chests and not expose their beauty except to their husbands and fathers, or the
fathers of their husbands, or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or
their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or what their ight hands
possess, or their male attendants who are incapable, or to children who are not yet aware
of women's nakedness; and that they not stamp their feet to make known what they
conceal of their adomment. And turn to Allah in repentance, all of you believers, that
you may succeed.
Id. at *"18-19.
interpreted to require it. 56 As such, veiling practices have differed among
the various Muslim cultures due to varying interpretations of the Qur'an and
the Hadith.57 Modernly, debates over the practice of veiling have arisen
within the Muslim community.58  Due to the complexity of the various
views and arguments involved, the substance of these debates is beyond the
scope of this article.59 Yet, the existence of the debate reveals an important
point: there are many different reasons why Muslim women wear the veil.6 °
The purpose of the veiling may be for the fulfillment of a religious
obligation,6' cultural practice,62 or as a symbol of political conviction.
Other Muslim women may veil simply to improve their family relations 63 or
to communicate certain messages to the outside world. 64 Regardless of the
56. Id.
57. Id.at'19-20.
58. NIGOSIAN, supra note 35, at 91. "Today, a large number of Muslim women insist on gender
equality in national, secular, and religious spheres. They challenge various patriarchal systems,
reject the constraints placed upon them, defy domination by men, and try to redefine their identity as
women." Id.
59. See generally, NIGOSIAN, supra note 35, at 90-92.
60. This is because there are "varying degrees of choice afforded to Muslim women as to what
they wear." HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 52, at 2. "Women may don Islamic dress in
fulfillment of what they see as a religious obligation, it can be a symbol of political conviction, a
cultural practice, or a means of avoiding criticism and harassment from men." Id. These reasons,
combined with other factors like social class, "may all influence how strictly a woman adheres to the
Islamic dress code." Id.
61. For example, Ginnah Muhammad was willing to give up her right to sue in civil court due to
her religious beliefs and offered the court the following explanation: "[T]his is my way of life and I
believe in the Holy Koran and God is first in my life." Transcript of Record, supra note 27, at 4. See
infra note 72 and accompanying text. Another Muslim woman by the name of Naushaba Habib has
described the veil as her "Islamic duty," in her effort to be as "perfect as possible." THE MUSLIM
VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES 116 (Sajida Sultana Alvi et al. eds., Women's Press
2003) [hereinafter THE MUSLIM VEIL].
62. A Muslim woman by the name of Zia Afsar admits she was "not influenced or pressured" to
wear the veil, but rather does so through her own independent decision to portray her "Muslim
identity." Id. at 115. Afsar now describes the veil as a part of her personality. Id. at 116.
63. One nineteen-year-old Palestinian declared that the veil freed her from "arguments and
headaches" with her parents. Id. at 20. She described how when she turned fourteen years old, her
"parents started to limit [her] activities and even telephone conversations," while her "brothers were
free to go and come as they pleased." Id. She then described the veil as a solution to her problems:
[A]s a way out, I asked to go to Qur'anic classes on Saturdays. There I met with several
veiled women of my age. They came from similar backgrounds. None of them seemed
to face my problems. Some told me that since they took the veil, their parents know that
they are not going to do anything that goes against Muslim morality. The more I hung
around with them, the more convinced I was that the veil is the answer to all Muslim
girls' problems here in North America.
Id. at 20-21.
64. See id. at 22.
Veiling also makes it clear to Muslim and non-Muslim men that the veiled women are
not available for dating. The veil is a powerful means of communicating all these
messages without uttering a word, and with this understanding, it is not surprising that
women have discovered and adopted it.
Id.
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reason, it is clear that these women care deeply about their decision to veil in
our modem society, and the practice will often be strongly defended.
Despite the veil's undefined history and often unclear and multitude of
purposes, it cannot be denied that certain Muslim women see the veil as an
obligation.65 In some instances, a Muslim woman may rather suffer harsh
consequences than to publicly unveil.66 Problems therefore arise when
society pushes for the veil's removal, while the Muslim woman desires to
remain grounded in her beliefs. Thus, the existence of the veil is
inextricably linked to its integration into modem societies worldwide.
C. Reactions to the Veil in America and Abroad
Keeping in mind the veil's sacred importance to certain Muslim women
around the globe, it is helpful to look at how the modem world is responding
to veiling, especially in America. Given America's deeply rooted tradition
of protecting religious practices, the treatment of veiled Muslims has opened
the door for harsh criticism. 67 An unfortunate example is the treatment that
many Muslim-Americans endured after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001,68 where mosques were vandalized, hate crimes rose, thousands of men
were placed into deportation proceedings, and others were "arrested in an
65. Seesupra note 61.
66. A Muslim woman named Amira Elias describes the misery she endured by sticking to her
religious beliefs and wearing the veil:
I want[ed] to please God. If the hijab pleases Him, I'll do it, and be proud of wearing it
because of my love and faith in Him. So I completely changed my wardrobe ... and
transformed myself from a modem-looking Canadian woman to a completely shrouded
woman .... Then... problems began.... I was frightened of being looked at strange. I
hated being stared at .... I secluded myself at home, and did not want to go out .... I
became extremely depressed, and even got admitted to a hospital for a week because of
depression .... [But] I was still determined to obey God and not change the way I
dressed.
THE MUSLIM VEIL, supra note 61, at 112-15. The lengths Amira Elias was willing to go to honor
her religion are proof enough that American courts should not lightly approach the issue of forceful
unveiling.
67. As one Muslim writer argues, "widespread incidents [in the wider Western society] often
convince even more Muslims of the hypocrisy of the Western world concerning freedom of
expression and individual liberty, further poisoning the relationship between Muslims and non-
Muslims." Id. at xiii.
68. The terrorist attacks of September I1, 2001 were a series of coordinated suicide attacks by al-
Qaeda terrorists who hijacked commercial passenger airliners and crashed them into the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in the nation's capitol. For a detailed account of
that day, see CNN.com/U.S., September ]I: Chronology of Terror, Sept. 12, 2001,
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/.
array of terrorism cases.,, 69 As a result, Muslim women have been warned
not to wear veils in public, 70 and many suffer day-to-day discrimination. 71
Yet veiled Muslims deal with more than just blatant discrimination as they
try to integrate into American culture, as illustrated by several recent court
cases.
In 2006, for example, a Michigan district court judge refused to allow
Ginnnah Muhammad to wear her veil in court, and ultimately dismissed her
case when she wouldn't unveil. 72  In another 2006 case, a Florida court of
appeal held that a Muslim woman could not wear her veil in a driver's
license photo.73 Although these recent cases deal with civil matters, they
still shed light on our country's views toward the practice of veiling in our
69. Elliott, supra note 31. Some Muslim women had their headscarves ripped off or cigarette
lighters thrust at their heads. Mackenzie Carpenter, Muslim Women Say Veil is More About
Expression than Oppression, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/headlines/20011028muslimwomennat3p3.asp. Shockingly, a Muslim
reporter for a Seattle newspaper who wore a veil to see how Muslim "women were being treated was
pushed into the path of a truck." Id. During this time, "[s]ome Muslims changed their names to
avoid job discrimination," for example changing "Mohammed" to "Moe" or "Osama" to "Sam."
Elliott, supra note 31. Also, "[s]cores of families left for Canada or returned to their native
countries." Id.
70. See id. This is most likely in an effort to avoid discrimination still stemming from the 9/11
attacks.
71. For example, Wal-Mart recently issued a public apology for the comments made by one of its
employees in Utah. See Associated Press, Wal-Mart Apologizes to Muslim Woman Who Said
Cashier Mocked Face Veil, FOxNEWS.COM, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,331389,00.html. While the veiled Muslim woman was checking out at Wal-Mart, a cashier
said, "Please, don't stick me up." Id. A Wal-Mart vice-president apologized by saying, "I can
assure you that the associate in question was disciplined in accordance with our employment policies
as a result of the situation." Id. Apparently the employees at the Utah store also were to undergo
"'sensitivity training', specifically in the Islamic faith and Muslim culture." Id.
72. Ginnah Muhammad brought a small-claims action in October 2006, in which she "contested
a rental car company's charging her $2,750 to repair a vehicle after thieves broke into it." Zachary
Gorchow, Judge Tosses Out Muslim Woman's Case After She Refuses to Remove Veil, THE SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 22, 2006. Muhammad wore a scarf and veil that covered her face and
head, except for her eyes. Id. Judge Paul Paruk asked Muhammad to remove her veil so that he
could see her face and see whether she was telling the truth. Id. When Muhammad refused, Judge
Paruk dismissed her case. Id. Muhammad later said, "I just feel so sad .... I feel that the Court is
there for justice for us. I didn't feel like the court recognized me as a person that needed justice. I
just feel I can't trust the court." Id.
73. In 2001, a Florida DMV clerk allowed Sultaana Freeman to take a driver's license photo
while wearing her veil. Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 51
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The Florida DMV later realized this had occurred by mistake, and
thereafter told Freeman that she could either return to take a photo without her veil, or have her
license cancelled. Id. at 51-52. Freeman, who had converted to Islam a few years earlier, refused to
remove her veil for religious reasons and eventually brought suit against the state. Id. at 52.
Freeman claimed that the Department violated her First Amendment rights by "clearly making her
choose between violating her religious tenets or sacrificing her driver's license." Id. The court ruled
against Freeman, holding that her First Amendment rights were not violated. Id. at 57. The court
noted that, "[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious
preference .... Consequently, it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no
law regulating conduct that may in some way result in... disadvantage to some religious sects ... 
Id. (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 559, 606 (1961)).
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society. Although complaints may arise over such incidents, many of them
fail to reach the restrictive measures adopted in other countries around the
world. 74
It is therefore helpful to look beyond America's borders to see how
countries across the globe have addressed the extent to which veiling is
permitted. In Turkey, there is a complete ban on Islamic face-coverings in
all civic spaces, even though as many as sixty-five percent of Turkish
women wear headscarves. 75  However, recently in 2008, the Turkish
Parliament began to overturn some of the bans.7 6 France has put a ban on
headscarves and other "conspicuous religious symbols" in state schools.
77
74. Therefore, although many Muslims may be unhappy with some of America's policies, "they
still come here because the United States offers what they're missing at home." Elliott, supra note
31. As one Iranian exile and author said, "America has always been the promised land for Muslims
and non-Muslims." Id. The "lures" of economic opportunity and political freedom have "been
enough to conquer fears that America is an inhospitable place for Muslims." Id.
75. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/5414098.stm. These "civic spaces" include schools, private and public universities, and all
official buildings. Id. This is because "for ... 80 years Turks have lived in a secular state founded
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who rejected headscarves as backward-looking in his campaign to
secularise Turkish society." Id. The European Court of Human Rights had ruled the ban legitimate
in November 2005. Id. However, this ban is not without controversial effect. In one case, a military
officer "ordered a girl wearing a headscarf to leave a high school stage, where she was waiting to
receive a prize in a writing competition." Associated Press, Turkish Bill Could End Islamic Head
Scarf Ban at Universities, Jan. 29, 2008, FOXNEWS.COM, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,326307,00.html. In another instance, a "member of a pro-Islamic party was booed out of the
swearing-in session in the parliament in 1999 for wearing a head scarf and was banned from taking
the parliamentary oath." Id.
76. See Turkey Ends Student Headscarf Ban, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/world/europe/7259694.stm. In February 2008, the Turkish Parliament adopted a government bill
lifting the decades-old ban on wearing a headscarf in Turkish universities. Alexander Bakustin, Will
Muslim Veil Split Secular Turkey?, Feb. 15, 2008, RUSSIAN NEWS & INFO. AGENCY,
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080214/99215548.html. In that same month, the bill was signed into law
by Turkish President Abdullah Gul. Turkey Ends Student Headscarf Ban, supra. The new law
allows female students to "wear headscarves at universities as long as they [are tied] under the chin,
leaving ... faces more exposed." Turkish Bill Could End Islamic Head Scarf Ban at Universities,
supra note 75. However, chadors, veils and burqas are still completely banned. Id. One Turkish
lawmaker told reporters that the "main aim is to end the discrimination experienced by a section of
society just because of their personal beliefs." Gareth Jones & Hidir Goktas, Turkish Parliament
Lifts University Headscarf Ban, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/id
USL0967026720080209?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews. This change in Turkish law has
caused great debates among the Turkish community. Id. "[T]ens of thousands of people waving
Turkish flags and chanting secularist slogans staged a protest rally against the changes just a few
[miles] from the parliament .. " Id.
77. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, supra note 75. This ban was introduced in 2004, and it
received "overwhelming political and public support in a country where the separation of state and
religion is enshrined in law." Id. By banning such religious items as Muslim veils, Sikh turbans,
Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crucifixes, the law aimed to "maintain France's tradition of
strictly separating state and religion." French Scarf Ban Comes into Force, BBC NEWS, Sept. 2,
The Italian parliament has forbidden the wearing of a burqa in public for
anti-terrorism purposes."8  Similarly, the Dutch government recently
implemented a "total ban" of burqas and other face veils in public.79
Yet in other instances around the world, the veil has proven resilient to
modernization and development. 80 In Afghanistan, it is near universal for
Muslim women to wear burqas.81 There is no total ban on Islamic dress in
the United Kingdom.82  Russia's Supreme Court overturned a ruling that
forbade the wearing of headscarves in passport photos.8 3 Thus, it is clear
that the veil has been controversial in America and around the world.
Today, this controversy is extending into the American courts.
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/wordd/europe/3619988.stm. Public opinion polls in 2004 indicated
that "about 70 percent of the French [were] in favor of the measure. And even in the French Muslim
community, Muslim women favor[ed] a ban 49 percent to 43 percent." Jim Bittermann, France
Backs School Head Scarf Ban, CNNINT'L.coM, Feb. 10, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/
europe/02/10/france.headscarves/index.html. However, the ban was not met without opposition.
The Human Rights Watch directly opposed the ban, claiming that because "wearing a headscarf is
not only about religious expression ... [but also] about religious obligation," it is "an unwarranted
infringement on the right to religious practice." France: Headscarf Ban Violates Religious
Freedom, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 27, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/02/26/france-
headscarf-ban-violates-religious-freedom. Human Rights Watch continued:
Some in France have used the headscarf issue as a pretext for voicing anti-immigrant and
anti-Muslim sentiments. Some arguments appear to be based on the premise that all
Muslims want to oppress women, or that women and girls who choose to veil do not
understand women's rights. Public debate has also touched on many other significant
social issues: religious fundamentalism and political uses of religious symbols;
oppression of girls and women; levels of immigration; discrimination and lack of
economic opportunity for immigrant communities; pluralism and national integration.
Id. Also in 2004, two French journalists were kidnapped by Islamic extremists, who threatened to
kill the journalists if France did not abolish the "headscarf law." Hostages Plead: Lift Headscarf
Ban, CNNINT'L.COM, Aug. 31, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/08/30/france.
hostages.villepin/index.html. That same group had recently executed an Italian reporter after Italy
refused to withdraw troops from Iraq. Id. France refused to budge on the law, and eventually the
extremists released the hostages. Freed French Hostages Head Home, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4116849.stm. The extremists claimed they released the hostages
due to France's stance on the Iraq War. Id.
78. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, supra note 75.
79. Alexandra Hudson, Dutch to Ban Wearing of Muslim Burqa in Public, REUTERS, Nov. 17,
2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL 1720620620061117.
80. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3, *21 (D.C. Jan. 14,
2005).
81. Id.
82. See Lawyers 'Can Wear Veils in Court', BBC News, Nov. 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/uk/6134804.stm. In fact, legal advisors and solicitors are allowed to wear veils in court, as long
as the veil doesn't interfere with the "interests ofjustice." Id.
83. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, supra note 75.
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III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Early History
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy
the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' 8 4 Although
this portion of the Sixth Amendment, known as the "Confrontation
Clause,"85 has existed since the passage of the Bill of Rights, its history and
origins are unclear.8 6 Despite this uncertainty, in 1895 the Supreme Court
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The full text of the Sixth Amendment is as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. The Confrontation Clause was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1965. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment's right of an
accused to confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right and is made obligatory on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
85. The U.S. Supreme Court first used the term "Confrontation Clause" in 1965 in an opinion
written by Justice Brennan. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Oddly, the Court did not use
the term in Pointer v. Texas, which was decided on the very same day. See supra note 84.
86. The language of the Confrontation Clause "comes to us on faded parchment," with a history
tracing back to the "beginnings of Western legal culture." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988)
(citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The origins of the
right of confrontation have been traced back over 2,000 years to the time of the Romans, when
Roman Governor Festus addressed the rights of his prisoner, Paul. Festus said, "It is not the manner
of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to
face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him." Daniel H.
Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 384 (1959). It
has been argued that the right of confrontation existed in England before the right to trial by jury. Id.
Commentators have also traced the right of confrontation back to the 1603 English trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh. Id. at 388-89. Raleigh was convicted of treason through an alleged co-conspirator's
admission, which was obtained by means of torture. Id. Raleigh argued that the admission was false
and demanded that the witness appear before him in trial, saying: "[T]he Proof of the Common Law
is by witness and jury: let [the witness] be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my
face..." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6 at 371; see also Murphy, supra note 9 at 1244
n.6. Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death, causing one of the trial judges to pronounce:
"[T]he justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir
Walter Raleigh." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, at 371. Through a series of reforms,
English law developed a right of confrontation "that limited these abuses." Id. Even in America's
earliest days, many "declarations of rights adopted around the time of the Revolution" addressed the
right of confrontation, in response to controversial examination practices used in the colonies. Id. at
372. The Founders responded by including the Confrontation Clause in "the proposal that became
the Sixth Amendment." Id. For an alternate theory on the origins of the Confrontation Clause, see
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27
RUTGERS L. J. 77 (1995) (proposing that the Clause originated from criminal procedure that existed
in the newly formed states and that it did not come from overseas).
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began identifying the primary interests that animate the Confrontation
Clause, first directly discussed in Mattox v. United States.87 In Mattox the
Court identified that the Clause's primary function is to ensure the reliability
of evidence presented at criminal trials through the use of adversarial
testing. s
The Court's subsequent decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause
continued to address the guarantee of adversarial testing, specifically in
cases involving ex parte testimony submitted through deposition and
affidavit,8 9 written testimony,90 and exclusion of the accused from trial. 9'
The Court has also clarified that the Clause applies to extra-judicial
testimonial utterances as well. 92
Throughout time, two distinct lines of cases emerged in which the Court
addressed Confrontation Clause issues. 93 The most prominent line of cases
87. 156 U.S. 237 (1895); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (calling Mattox
the "earliest case interpreting the [Confrontation] Clause"). In at least one earlier case, the Court
referred to, but did not directly address a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 151 (1878) (stating "[t]he constitutional right of a prisoner
to confront the witness and cross-examine him is not to be abrogated" without supporting this with
any legal authority).
88. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43. The Court in Mattox specifically referred to the dangers of
depositions or ex parte affidavits that were used against a criminal defendant "in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness." Id. at 243. The Court stated that the criminal
defendant should "never lose the benefit" of these safeguards, which give him
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43. It is important to note, however, that the Court addressed the possibility of exceptions
to these Confrontation Clause guarantees by saying that "general rules of law of this kind, however
beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Id. at 243. As an example, the
Court said the Clause could not prevent a dying declaration. Id.
89. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 180 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox, 156 U.S. at
237.
90. See Green, 399 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., concurring). For other examples, see Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); and West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
91. See Green, 399 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., concurring). For other examples, see In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948) and Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
92. See Green, 399 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that although
historically the Clause primarily protected against trial by affidavit, "[a] restricted reading of the
clause ... that attempts to differentiate between affidavits, as a substitute for first-hand testimony,
and extra-judicial testimonial utterances" cannot be defended. Id. Justice Harlan concluded that this
distinction is irrelevant by pointing out that the Court's early recognition of the dying declaration
exception to the Confrontation Clause indicates extra-judicial testimonial declarations are also a
concern of the Sixth Amendment. Id.
93. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). "Most of this Court's encounters with the
Confrontation Clause have involved either the admissibility of out-of-court statements ... or
restrictions on the scope of cross-examination." Id. (internal citations omitted).
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involves the relation between the Confrontation Clause and the rules of
evidence governing hearsay,94 while the other deals with restrictions on the
scope of cross-examination. 95 Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a third
line of cases began to emerge which involve the defendant's constitutional
94. These cases involve the overlap of the evidence rules governing hearsay and the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause, which has caused confusion. See Murphy, supra note 9,
at 1245. On one extreme, the Clause could be interpreted to mean that no hearsay may be admitted
against a defendant unless the witness actually testifies in trial. Id. The opposite extreme is that the
Clause only applies to witnesses when they actually testify in trial, which would mean it would not
bar hearsay at all. Id. The Court was forced to start addressing this problem after the Confrontation
Clause was made applicable to the states through Texas v. Pointer in 1965. Andrew Dylan, Working
Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1905, 1906
(2007). Thus, a "theory of the Confrontation Clause" began to develop in order to address the
relationship between the Clause and hearsay rules in the lower courts. Id. In 1970, Justice Harlan
twice proposed a method of analyzing issues involving the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules,
but in both cases he failed to convince the majority to adopt his theory. Id.; see Green, 399 U.S. at
172 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Ten years later, the Court finally attempted to lay out a general rule in Ohio v. Roberts.
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). This rule, which involved determining the availability of
the witness and the reliability of the out-of-court statement, proved to be difficult in application.
Dylan, supra, at 1907. Complaints arose that the Roberts test was unclear and only served to
"constitutionalize" hearsay rules. Id. In response to growing dissatisfaction and confusion, the
Supreme Court struck down the Roberts test in 2004 and replaced it with a new test that turned on
the testimonial aspect of the out-of-court statement, and therefore restricted the Clause's protection
to testimonial statements. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The test requires that,
where the admission of testimonial out-of-court statements is at issue, the statements will only be
allowed if the witness is (1) unavailable and (2) if there was a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. See id. at 68. Otherwise, the testimonial statement will be constitutionally barred by
the Confrontation Clause. See id. The Court further developed this test in Davis v. Washington,
where it attempted to distinguish between "testimonial" and "non-testimonial" statements. See
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). For a detailed discussion of the recent impact of Davis,
see Dylan, supra.
95. These cases involve the Confrontation Clause's guarantee of cross-examination and
specifically address whether a witness' forgetfulness while testifying in trial violates that right. This
issue first arose in California v. Green, where the Court declined to conclude whether a witness'
forgetfulness in trial about his prior statements so greatly hindered the defendant's cross-
examination that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 1252; see
also Green, 399 U.S. at 183. The Court also declined to revisit this same issue in Delaware v.
Fensterer. Murphy, supra note 9, at 1252; see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
However, the Court was forced to resolve this issue in United States v. Owens, where the defendant
claimed that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a witness testified as to prior
statements but suffered extensive memory loss on the stand. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S.
554 (1988). In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority denied the defendant's claim,
holding that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish." Id. at 559 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented, arguing that the Confrontation Clause guarantees more than just the procedural
right of cross-examination. Id. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting). They wrote that the Clause ensures
"full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial," which guarantees more than just an
"opportunity." Id. at 568 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 159).
right to literally "confront" those witness that speak against him at trial. The
remainder of this section will focus on this third line of cases and its
applicability to the issue at hand.
B. The Confrontation Clause and the Issue of "Face-to-Face"
Confrontation
The two U.S. Supreme Court cases of Coy v. Iowa96 and Maryland v.
Craig97 address the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause guarantees a
criminal defendant the literal right to confront his accusers "face-to-face."
Specifically, these two cases involve the testimony of child sex abuse
victims. Yet the rules that arise from these cases have resulted in a broader
and more far-reaching application than just child abuse cases.
1. Coy v. Iowa
In August of 1985, John Coy was arrested and charged with sexually
assaulting two young girls. 98  In order to protect the young girls from
possible trauma caused by seeing their alleged assailant at trial, the judge
allowed a large screen to be placed between Coy and the witness stand. 99
This screen prevented the girls from seeing Coy during their testimony, but
allowed others in the courtroom to see the girls.'00 Coy "strenuously"
objected to the use of the screen, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment
confrontation right to "face" the witnesses before him.'0 ' The trial court
rejected these arguments and Coy was convicted. 02
In a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed Coy's
conviction by finding that the procedure had created a Confrontation Clause
violation.0 3 Using literal interpretation, 104 anecdotal history,'0 5 references
96. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
97. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
98. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014. The girls, both thirteen years old, were camping out in the backyard
of a house next door to Coy's. Id. After the girls were asleep, Coy allegedly entered their tent
wearing a stocking over his head, shined a flashlight in their eyes, and warned them not to look at
him. Id. Neither girl saw her assailant's face. Id.
99. Id. The placement of the screen was authorized by an Iowa statute, which was designed to
protect child witnesses. Id. at 1014-15.
100. Id. at 1015. After lighting adjustments in the courtroom, "the screen would enable [Coy]
dimly to perceive the witnesses," but the witnesses could not see Coy at all. Id. However, the
screen did not block the girls from the views of the judge and the jury. Id. at 1027 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id. at 1015.
102. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Coy's conviction and rejected his Confrontation
Clause argument, reasoning that "the ability to cross-examine the witnesses was not impaired by the
screen." Id. The court concluded that, because the ability to cross-examine existed, no
Confrontation Clause violation occurred. Id.
103. Id. at 1022.
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to core human values,'0 6 and Supreme Court precedent, '0 7 Justice Scalia
concluded that the "irreducible literal meaning" of the Confrontation Clause
guarantees the criminal defendant "a right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial."'' 18  Because the screen physically
prevented the witnesses from seeing Coy, he was denied his guarantee of
literal "face-to-face" confrontation.'0 9 Scalia conceded that exceptions to
104. Id. at 1016. Justice Scalia wrote that "'[s]imply as a matter of English' [the Clause] confers
at least 'a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial."' Id. (quoting
Green, 399 U.S. at 175). Justice Scalia also noted that it confers this right "[s]imply as a matter of
Latin as well, since the word 'confront' ultimately derives from the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra'
meaning 'against' or 'opposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)." Id.
105. Id. Justice Scalia referred to the story of the Roman Festus and his discussion of his prisoner
Paul's treatment. Id. He also referred to Shakespeare, who had Richard the Second say: "Then call
them to our presence-face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and
the accused freely speak .... " Id. Justice Scalia also referred to a quote by President Eisenhower,
who discussed face-to-face confrontation in his Kansas hometown:
In Abilene, he said, it was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you
disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without
suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry .... In this country, if someone dislikes
you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow."
Id. at 1017-18.
106. Id. "[Tihere is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation
between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution."' Id. at 1017
(quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). Justice Scalia argues "[i]t is always more
difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back."' Id. at 1019. Justice Scalia
also describes the confrontation right as stemming from "human feelings of what is necessary for
fairness." Id. at 1018.
107. Id. "[R]ecently, we have described the literal right to confront the witness at the time of trial
as forming the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1017 (referring to
Green, 399 U.S. at 157) (internal quotations omitted). Justice Scalia also refers to the plurality
opinion of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, where the Court described one of the protections of the
Confrontation Clause as "the right physically to face those who testify against him." Id. (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)).
108. Id. at 1021 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 175) (Harlan, J. concurring).
109. Id. at 1020. In examining the facts of this case, Justice Scalia stated that, with the screen
successfully enabling the complaining witnesses to avoid viewing Coy during trial, "[i]t is difficult
to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face
encounter." Id. He continued: "That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful
rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or
reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have
costs." Id. Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, strongly disagreed with
the majority opinion. See id. at 1025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). While recognizing the preference
for face-to-face confrontation, Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that public
policy demanded an exception in this case. Id. at 1031. They further argued that the screen in this
case "did not interfere with ... the 'purposes of confrontation,"' namely cross-examination. Id. at
1026-27 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 158). The dissenting Justices argued this was because "the
girls' testimony was given under oath, was subject to unrestricted cross-examination, and 'the jury
that [was] to decide the defendant's fate [could] observe the demeanor of the witness[es] in making
[their] statement[s], thus aiding the jury in assessing [their] credibility."' Id. at 1027 (quoting Green,
the confrontation right may exist, but the majority explicitly left this
question "for another day.""10 That day came two years later, when the
Supreme Court decided Maryland v. Craig"' in 1990.
2. Maryland v. Craig
In October of 1986, a grand jury charged Sandra Craig with child abuse
and various other offenses. 1 2  At trial, the judge allowed several child
witnesses to testify by one-way closed circuit television" 3 in order to
prevent the child from suffering "serious emotional distress" that would
result from testifying in front of Craig. " 4 "Craig objected to the use of [this]
procedure on Confrontation Clause grounds."" 5 The trial court rejected
Craig's argument and allowed the use of the one-way closed circuit
television, after which "[t]he jury convicted Craig on all counts."" 6
399 U.S. at 158). Because the "purposes of confrontation" were met, Coy's "only complaint [was a]
very narrow objection that the [witnesses] could not see him while they testified." Id. Yet thedissenting Justices argued that because a valid public policy exception existed in regard to literal
"face-to-face" confrontation, that objection should not have succeeded. See id. at 1032.
110. Justice Scalia noted that if such an exception did arise, it "would surely be allowed only
when necessary to further an important public policy." Id. at 1021. The majority did not find that
the Iowa statute addressing child abuse warranted such an exception, to the dismay of the dissenting
Justices. Id. However, in her concurring opinion Justice O'Connor argued that, although an
exception was not warranted in this case, such an exception could arise more easily than JusticeScalia made it seem, Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring). More pointedly, she stated the "rightphysically to face those who testify against . . . [the accused] . , . Is not absolute," but rather
"'reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial."' Id. at 1024 (quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S.
at 51 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (first emphasis
added). This contradicted Justice Scalia's theory, which considers the right of confrontation as
absolute, minus a few rare exceptions. Id. at 1020-21 (majority opinion). Justice O'Connor
continued, "I would permit use of a particular trial procedure that called for something other thanface-to-face confrontation if that procedure was necessary to futher [sic] an important public policy."
Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. 497U.S.836(1990).
112. Id. at 840. Specifically, Craig was charged "with child abuse, first and second degree sexual
offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery." Id. The "victim in each count was a six-
year-old girl, who ... attended a kindergarten and prekindergarten center owned and operated by
Craig." Id.
113. Id. at 843. This procedure allows the child witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel to enter
a separate room while the judge, jury, and defendant stay in the courtroom. Id. at 841. "The child
witness is then examined and cross-examined in the separate room, while a video monitor records
and displays the witness' testimony to those in the courtroom." Id. During this process the child
witness is unable to see the defendant. Id. The defendant is able to communicate with counsel via
electronic communication, in order for objections to be made "as if the witness were testifying in the
courtroom." Id. at 842.
114. A Maryland statute made this procedure available only after the trial judge determined the
child witnesses' testimony in the courtroom would "result in the child suffering serious emotional
distress such that the child cannot ... communicate" when in the presence of the defendant. Id. at
841-42 n. 1. Once this condition was met, the closed-circuit television procedure could be invoked.
Id.
115. Id. at 842.
116. Id. at 843. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded the case, but not on
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In deciding this case the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Coy and
set out to answer a question that it had previously left unanswered: What
exceptions to a defendant's right to physical "face-to-face" confrontation
exist? 117 In a five-to-four opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the majority
upheld the constitutionality of the closed-circuit television procedure,
holding that the Confrontation Clause reflects only a "preference for face-to-
face confrontation at trial."' 1 8  The majority reached this conclusion by
focusing on Confrontation Clause exceptions made in past hearsay cases
119
and by focusing on the possibility of achieving the Clause's primary
purposes without literal "face-to-face" confrontation. 120 Using this logic, the
Confrontation Clause grounds. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not show
specifically that the child's emotional distress would be caused as a direct result of face-to-face
confrontation with the defendant, as required by the state statute. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the Confrontation Clause issue. Id.
117. Justice O'Connor wrote that although the literal text and historical roots of the Confrontation
Clause "guarantee[ ] the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier
of fact," the Supreme Court has "never held . . . that [it] guarantees criminal defendants the absolute
right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial." Id. at 844 (quoting Coy v. Iowa,
487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988)). Instead, Justice O'Connor emphasized that Coy left this question "for
another day" and that the current case required the Court to give an answer. Id. (quoting Coy, 487
U.S. at 1021).
118. Id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
119. Justice O'Connor stated, "[W]e have ... recognized ... that [face-to-face confrontation] is
not the sine qua non of the confrontation right." Id. at 847. The Court supported this contention by
pointing to cases that allow exceptions to "face-to-face" confrontation in hearsay situations. Id. at
847-48. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (allowing an exception for dying
declarations); see also Boujaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-82 (1987) (allowing an
exception for hearsay statements of non-testifying co-conspirators). Based on these hearsay cases,
the Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause "cannot simply mean face-to-face confrontation,
for the Clause would then . . . prohibit the admission of any accusatory hearsay statement made by
an absent declarant-a declarant who is undoubtedly as much a 'witness against' a defendant as one
who actually testifies at trial." Craig, 497 U.S. at 849. Justice O'Connor stated that such a literal
reading of the Confrontation Clause "would 'abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result
long rejected as unintended and too extreme."' Id. at 848 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63)). In his
dissent, Justice Scalia strongly disagreed with this use of hearsay precedent. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id. at 849. The majority focused on the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, the role literal
"face-to-face" confrontation plays in this purpose, and whether this purpose could be fulfilled
without the "face-to-face" element. Id. at 845. Justice O'Connor wrote that "[t]he central concern
of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant
by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."
Id. at 845 (emphasis added). To support this contention, Justice O'Connor referred to the Court's
first interpretation of the Clause's primary purpose in Mattox and in the more recent case of
California v. Green:
[T]he right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause includes not only a "personal
examination," ... but also "(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under
oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie
by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-
845
majority concluded that literal "face-to-face" confrontation is not an
"indispensable" element of the Confrontation Clause.'
However, the majority clarified that the "face-to-face" requirement
"may [not] easily be dispensed with."'12  As a result, guarantees of the
Confrontation Clause "may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face
confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured."' 2 3  In determining the assurance of
reliability element, Justice O'Connor focused on the fulfillment of the
"elements of confrontation":
The combined effect of these elements of confrontation-[ 1]
physical presence, [2] oath, [3] cross-examination, and [4]
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact-serves the purposes of
the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against
an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing
that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings. 124
Thus, the majority laid out a rule for determining the constitutionality of an
exception to the Confrontation Clause's "preference" for face-to-face
confrontation. 1
25
When applying this rule to the current case, the majority found the one-
way closed circuit television procedure did not violate the primary purposes
of the Confrontation Clause, and therefore satisfied the reliability
requirement. 126 Further, the majority found the state's interest in protecting
examination, the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'; [and] (3)
permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the
witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."
Id. at 845-46 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). The majority then boiled this
down to "elements" of confrontation: "physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation
of demeanor by the trier of fact." Id. at 846. The majority concluded that even if the literal "face-to-face" component is absent, the preservation of all other "elements" of confrontation "ensures that
testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally
equivalent to ... live, in-person testimony." Id at 85 1. In his dissent, Justice Scalia heavily opposed
this analysis. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 849-50.
122. Id. at 850.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 846.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 852. The court reached this conclusion by applying the "elements of confrontation:"
Maryland's procedure preserves all of the other elements of the confrontation right: The
child witness must be competent to testify and must testify under oath; the defendant
retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and
defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the
witness as he or she testifies.
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children victims sufficient and in compliance with the public policy
requirement. 2 7  Therefore, the procedure did not violate Craig's
Confrontation Clause rights.1 28  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, responded to the majority's opinion with a scathing
dissent. 129
Id. at 851. The Court concluded: "We are ... confident that use of the one-way closed circuit
television procedure, where necessary to further an important state interest, does not impinge upon
the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 852.
127. Id. at 855. "[Tlhe state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in
a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a
child witness ... to testify ... against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation." Id.
128. Id. at 857.
Because there is no dispute that the child witnesses in this case testified under oath, were
subject to full cross-examination, and were able to be observed by the judge, jury, and
defendant as they testified, we conclude that, to the extent that a proper finding of
necessity has been made, the admission of such testimony would be consonant with the
Confrontation Clause.
Id.
129. See id. at 860-70. Claiming that the Court has seldom "failed so conspicuously to sustain a
categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion," Justice
Scalia argued that the majority applied "'interest-balancing' analysis where the text of the
Constitution simply does not permit it." Id. at 860, 870. By making "face-to-face" confrontation
one of many "elements of confrontation," Scalia argued that the majority unjustifiably
recharacterized the Confrontation Clause and denied what it explicitly guarantees. Id. at 862.
Additionally, Scalia argued that the majority supported its "antitextual conclusion" with
inappropriate cases, namely those that involved hearsay. Id. at 863. Scalia emphasized that the
hearsay cases address the implications of the Clause and the receipt of "other-than-first-hand"
testimony, while the current case involves an available witness testifying at trial. !d. In Scalia's
view, the "reliability" analysis used in hearsay cases should not be applied "to permit what is
explicitly forbidden by the constitutional text." Id. at 865. He continued, "[T]hat the defendant
should be confronted by the witnesses who appear at trial is not a preference 'reflected' by the
Confrontation Clause; it is a constitutional right unqualifiedly guaranteed." Id. at 863. Justice Scalia
also disagreed with the majority's public policy rationale. While the "face-to-face" testimony may
in some circumstances upset a witness, Scalia argued that "unwillingness cannot be a valid excuse
under the Confrontation Clause, whose very object is to place the witness under the sometimes
hostile glare of the defendant." Id. at 866. To illustrate the consequences of"[t]his subordination of
explicit constitutional text to currently favored public policy," Scalia gave the following
hypothetical:
[T]he following scene can be played out in an American courtroom for the first time in
two centuries: A father whose young daughter has been given over to the exclusive
custody of his estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has been taken into custody
by the State's child welfare department, is sentenced to prison for sexual abuse on the
basis of testimony by a child the parent has not seen or spoken to for many months; and
the guilty verdict is rendered without giving the parent so much as the opportunity to sit
in the presence of the child, and to ask, personally or through counsel, "it is really not
true, is it, that I-your father (or mother) whom you see before you id these terrible
things?"
Id. at 861. For another detailed discussion of Scalia's dissent in this case and a general discussion of
the theories of originalism and non-originalism, see Murphy, supra note 9, at 1246.
847
C. Recent Applications of Maryland v. Craig in American Courts
In the seventeen years since the Supreme Court decided Craig, 130 lower
courts have addressed the right of confrontation in a variety of contexts. In
sixteen states Craig may not apply at all, due to explicit "face-to-face"
confrontation language in their respective constitutions that grants more
protection than the United States Constitution. 131 Yet this is the exception.
The full force of Craig's authority applies in all federal courts and in the
thirty-four states with constitutions that mirror the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. In analyzing the necessity of "face-to-face"
confrontation, these lower courts have applied Craig's two-pronged test
under a great variety of fact patterns. 32 Such cases have involved
confrontation issues arising out of the use of two-way videoconference, 133
the physical positioning of the witness in a trial room, 134 and situations
where a witness physically covers his or her face while testifying.135  This
section will focus on cases in the third category, as they are most applicable
to the issue at hand.
130, To this date the Court has not revisited its decision in Craig, despite the urging of JusticeScalia, The opportunity arose twice (once in 1998 and once in 1999), but the Court denied certiorari
where it could have revisited its Confrontation Clause decisions in Craig. See Marx v. Texas, 528U.S. 1034 (1999); see also Danner v. Kentucky, 525 U.S. 1010 (1998). In both cases Scalia
dissented.
131. See Katherine W. Grearson, Proposed Uniform Child Witness Testimony Act: AnImpermissible Abridgment of Criminal Defendants' Rights, 45 B.C. L. REv. 467, 480-84 (2004).Under United States Constitutional law, state legislatures are free to afford their citizens equal orgreater rights than those in the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 480. Because each state drafts its own
constitution, there are many "textual and interpretive variations among state provisions." Id. Today,
thirty-four state constitutions contain confrontation clauses that conform to the U.S. ConstitutionConfrontation Clause. Aron Goldschneider & Morales v. Artuz, Concealment and Confrontation-Shades of Coy?, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 293, 295 n.22 (2003). The other sixteen stateshave confrontation clauses that use the explicit "face-to-face" language. Id. Whether a state in thislatter category will apply the Craig analysis depends upon whether a literal or functional interpretive
approach is taken. See Grearson, supra, at 481. Interestingly, Pennsylvania originally had a
constitution that explicitly provided for "face-to-face" confrontation, but in 2003 voters effectively
amended the Pennsylvania confrontation clause to conform to the U.S. Constitution. SeeGoldschneider, supra, at 295. The amendment presumably occurred in order to facilitate laws that
protect child witnesses. See id.
132. Most of these have involved child abuse cases, where the focus is on protecting the interests
of a child witness.
133. See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (1 th Cir. 2006) (finding no valid public policyjustification, and therefore a Confrontation Clause violation, where a witness from another countrytestified over two-way videoconference); but see Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926 (11 th Cir.2001) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation in testimony over two-way videoconference whenforeigners refused to travel to the United States to testify); see also United States v. Gigante, 166F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation where terminally ill witness gave
testimony from outside location via two-way videoconference).
134. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 631 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (Mass. 1994); see alsoCommonwealth v. Souza, 689 N.E.2d 1359, 1360 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Ellis v. United States, 313
F.3d 636, 639 (1st Cir. 2002).
135. See infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text.
848
[Vol. 36: 823, 2009] Confronting the Shadow
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In Morales v. Artuz, 136 the Second Circuit held that a criminal
defendant's confrontation right was not violated when an adverse witness
testified while wearing dark sunglasses.
137 During Morales' murder trial, 138
the judge allowed one of the prosecution's witnesses to wear dark sunglasses
to hide herself from Morales. 3 9  The jury convicted Morales, and he
appealed, arguing that the sunglasses interfered with his Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation. After a series of failed appeals, 4 ' the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals granted review of Morales's petition for habeas corpus,
although limited solely to the confrontation issue. 14  Upon review, the
Second Circuit concluded that the Craig precedent did not apply to this
case's specific facts and was therefore not controlling. 142  The court
reasoned that Craig deals with situations where there has been a complete
"physical" separation between the witness and defendant, not in a case
where the witness is physically present but "disguised."'' 43 The court further
136. 281 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002).
137. Seeid.at6l.
138. Hector Morales was arrested for allegedly shooting another man in the back outside an
apartment building. Id. at 56-57.
139. The witness, Tonita Sanchez, was present at the shooting. Id. at 56. She claimed to have
seen Morales walk up to the victim, say, "You are the one," and then pull out a gun and shoot him as
he ran away. Id. At trial, Sanchez wore dark sunglasses on the witness stand, and the judge
objected. Id. at 57. Sanchez wore the glasses out of fear that Morales or his friends would seek
retribution. Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 297. Despite the judge's orders to remove the
sunglasses, Sanchez refused to comply. Morales, 281 F.3d at 57. The judge ended up allowing
Sanchez to testify while wearing the sunglasses, rationalizing his decision by noting Sanchez's
genuine fear and concluding that Morales' confrontation rights would only be "partially" infringed.
Id.
140. In 1998 the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, unanimously affirmed the
conviction, finding that Morales' confrontation rights were not violated "under the unusual
circumstances presented." Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 299. That same year the New York
Court of Appeals denied leave for further appeal. Id. This led Morales to file a petition for habeas
corpus in the United States District Court in New York. Id.
141. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Morales'
petition for habeas corpus. Morales v. Artuz, No. 98CIV.6558(JGK), 2000 WL 1693563, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000). The law governing habeas corpus analysis required the court to overturn
the conviction only if the lower court's ruling was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law," or if it "resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at *3. The court
decided that Craig did not apply to the specific issue of whether a disguised witness violates a
defendant's right to confrontation and that this issue was not "clearly established" by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. The court further found that even if the Craig precedent did apply, the lower
court's ruling was not unreasonable because use of the sunglasses was justified by public policy and
because they had a "minimal" impact on the reliability of the testimony. Id. For a more detailed
analysis of the lower court reasoning, see Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 299-300.
142. Morales, 281 F.3d at 62.
143. Id. at 58. After reviewing Coy and Craig, the court found that those cases dealt with
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held that even if Craig did apply, no violation had occurred because the
reliability of the testimony was not compromised.' At least one state
supreme court has applied the Morales decision to similar facts. '45
Yet other courts have reached different conclusions about the
applicability of Craig to cases involving witness disguise. In People v.
Sammons,146 the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that a witness who
testified in a "full-face mask" violated the defendant's confrontation
rights. 47 Unlike Morales, this court found Craig applicable and controlling
because the mask similarly interfered with the "face-to-face" aspect of
confrontation. 48  Because the mask prevented the trier of fact from
adequately judging demeanor, the testimony's reliability was found to be
compromised, and a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred. 149
situations where "physical" separation occurred between the defendant and witness and not where "a
witness testifying in the presence of the defendant and the jury with a slight disguise." 1d.
Therefore, it refused to apply a Craig analysis. The court thus proceeded to apply its own case law
to the facts to determine if the lower court decision was unreasonable. Id.
144. Id. at 60. Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not focus on
whether an exception to "face-to-face confrontation" was necessary here for public policy reasons,
presumably because it found that Craig did not apply. Id. Instead, the court focused on concerns
over testimony reliability. Id. at 60-61. While conceding that the sunglasses did cause "some
impairment" to the jury's ability to consider the witness's demeanor, the court found this impairment
to be minimal. Id. In doing so, the court placed doubt over the value of demeanor evidence, mainly
supporting this proposition with empirical studies. Id. at 61. The court concluded:
[Tihe jurors had an entirely unimpaired opportunity to assess the delivery of Sanchez's
testimony, notice any evident nervousness, and observe her body language. Most
important, they had a full opportunity to combine these fully observable aspects of
demeanor with their consideration of the substance of her testimony, assessing her
opportunity to observe, the consistency of her account, any hostile motive, and all the
other traditional bases for evaluating testimony.
Id. at 61-62. For an extensive analysis of Morales v. Artuz, and an argument that the Second Circuit
committed a grave error in its holding, see Goldschneider, supra note 131.
145. See Commonwealth v. Lynch, 789 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2003).
146. 478 N.W.2d 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
147. Id. at 909. Martin Sammons was arrested by an undercover police officer for intending todeliver over 225 grams of cocaine. Id. at 904. At an entrapment hearing, a witness spoke against
Sammons while wearing a mask, which the defense counsel described as "a ski mask or some type
of mask where his face and head are not visible." Id. at 908 n.4. The prosecution argued that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to pre-trial entrapment hearings because the ultimate issue is
not one of guilt. Id. at 906. The court disagreed, holding that the Confrontation Clause does apply
to such hearings. Id. at 907.
148. Id. at 908. The court compared the mask to the screen used in Coy, stating that "a full-face
mask tends to diminish the aspect of personalization associated with testifying about a defendant 'to
his face."' Id. Thus, the court continued, "[the mask] may very well make a witness 'feel quite
differently' than when he has to repeat his story while looking at the defendant." Id.
149. Id. at 909. Also unlike the court in Morales, the Sammons court stressed the "utmost
importan[ce]" of demeanor evidence. Id. It accordingly held that the mask made the testimony
unreliable because it "foreclosed the opportunity for the trier of fact to adequately assess the
witness'[s] credibility through observation of demeanor." Id. at 908. The court briefly discussed a
public policy exception in this situation but concluded that this argument was foreclosed due to the
lack of reliability. Id.
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Similarly, in the more recent case of Romero v. State, 5° the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant's confrontation rights were
violated when a witness testified in a "disguise," composed of dark
sunglasses, a baseball cap, and a turned up collar.15' The court found Craig
applicable to the facts of this case and applied the two-prong test. 52 Under
the reliability prong, the court held that two of the "elements of
confrontation" were violated. The first-physical presence-was violated
even though the witness physically sat in front of the defendant because the
disguise "insulated" the witness from the defendant. 5 3  Second, the court
found that the disguise interfered with the jury's ability to properly observe
demeanor. 154  Together, the court concluded these violations destroyed the
testimony's reliability. The court also did not find a sufficient public policy
reason for creating a Confrontation Clause exception in this case, as required
by the second prong. 55 Taken altogether, the court found a clear violation
150. 173 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. Crim App. 2005).
151. Id. at 503. Israel Romero was indicted for aggravated assault. Id. At trial, one of the
prosecution's key witnesses entered the courtroom wearing "dark sunglasses, a baseball cap pulled
down over his forehead, and a long-sleeved jacked with its collar turned up and fastened so as to
obscure [his) mouth, jaw, and the lower half of his nose." Id. The witness apparently feared that
Romero would retaliate against himself and his family if his identity were revealed. Id. Romero
objected to this "disguise" and argued it violated his right to confrontation. Id. The trial court
overruled the objection and Romero was convicted. Id. at 504.
152. Id. at 505. Unlike the court in Morales, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apparently
found little trouble applying the Craig precedent. The court's analysis delves straight into the
application of the two-prong test without discussing Craig's applicability. See id.
153. Id. at 505. The court called the witness's physical presence in the courtroom "superficial"
because the disguise conferred "a degree of anonymity" that hid him from the defendant. Id. The
court noted that a witness is not allowed to "hide behind the shadow." Id. (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1018 (1988)). The court recognized that the Supreme Court found no violation in Craig
despite the absence of the physical presence element. Id. However, the court distinguished this case
because a second element was violated. Id.
154. Id. The court found that the disguise deprived the trier of fact of "the ability to observe [the
witness's] eyes and his facial expressions." Id. Although the jury could still evaluate the witness's
body language, this was no "adequate substitute for the jurors' ability to view a witness's face, the
most expressive part of the body and something that is traditionally regarded as one of the most
important factors in assessing credibility." Id. at 505-06. To hold otherwise, the court continued,
would remove the "face" from "face-to-face confrontation." Id. at 506.
155. Id. The court noted that a compelling interest might exist where a witness seeks protection
from retaliation by a defendant but found no such interest present in this case. Id. The court
emphasized that Romero already knew the witnesses' name and address, and that there was no
concrete evidence that Romero would retaliate. Id. The court further distinguished this case from
Craig by pointing out that this witness was an adult rather than a child and that adults are "made of
sterner stuff." Id. In addition, the witness was merely a bystander and not a victim. Id. Allowing
an exception every time a witness expressed fear of retaliation, the court argued, would eviscerate
the principle that face-to-face confrontation should only be deprived in "exceptional circumstances."
Id.
under the Craig test. 156  Two judges took issue with the decision in a
dissenting opinion, arguing that the disguise had a minimal effect on "face-
to-face" confrontation.'57
D. Unveiling and Confrontation Litigation in New Zealand
Despite the above applications and interpretations of Craig, no
American court has addressed the precise question of whether a
Confrontation Clause violation occurs when a Muslim woman testifies
against a criminal defendant while wearing a veil. However, at least one
case from abroad has ruled on the issue. This occurred only three years ago
in a New Zealand district court. 158
In Police v. Razamjoo,"59 two Muslim women attempted to testify in a
criminal trial while wearing their burqas. 160 The defendant argued that the
veil interfered with his right to a fair and public trial and expressed special
concern over the interference with the testimony's reliability.161
Accordingly, the defense labeled the burqa as "tantamount to
camouflage."' 162 After weighing the issues of free religious practice and the
guarantees of the New Zealand criminal justice system, the court held that
156. Id. at 507.
157. See id. at 507-09 (Meyers, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Meyers argued that the
elements of physical presence and demeanor were not compromised in this case: "I'm fairly
confident that the witness was there face-to-face to testify, was cross-examined, and that his
demeanor showed that he was scared to death of the defendant." Id. at 507. Judge Meyers further
argued that the witness's disguise served to comfort the witness, much like the children in Coy and
Craig, and that since no "face-to-face" confrontation was prevented by the disguise, there was no
harm caused. Id. at 508. Meyers compared the disguise to other situations where attorneys change a
witness's appearance in court, for example when "[d]runks are sobered up, addicts are cleaned up,
and the homeless are dressed up." Id. In a separate dissent, Judge Holcomb argued that the disguise
furthered the important state interest of protecting witnesses, which he argued was worthy of an
exception. Id. at 508-09.
158. For a detailed description of the New Zealand legal system, See The New Zealand Legal
System, http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/other/pamphlets/2001/legal-system.html (discussing the
New Zealand legal system in detail).
159. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3 (D.C. Jan. 14,2005).
160. Id. at *7. The defendant was on trial for insurance fraud for allegedly selling his Nissan
Bluebird and later claiming it was stolen. Id. at *13. The two Muslim women were called to
confirm events that would indicate the defendant engaged in this fraud. Id.
161. Id. at*15.
162. Id. at *55. The defense also claimed that condoning the veiled testimony would allow such
witnesses "the potential to infiltrate New Zealand's legal system by creating a separate justice
system for Muslims in what is essentially a secular society." Id. Pushing further, the defense
submitted that the wearing of a burqa "must be seen in the context of the political expression of the
Muslim religion or Islamism which aims to relegate the Western world back to the dark ages through
bombings of innocent people, televised executions and general dehumanization of women." Id. The
court considered such assertions offensive and ignorant, but considered the defense's fundamental
argument-that witnesses should not be allowed to veil-as valid. Id. at *64.
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the Muslim women had to unveil.163  In evaluating the appearance of the
veiled women at trial, the court gave a compelling description:
There was ... a strong sense of disembodiment, far greater than
arises in receiving evidence by video link or the playing of an
evidential videotape. It was all slightly unreal. The voice of the
rogue computer in 2001 A Space Odyssey quickly came to mind as
an example of a voice conveying some sense of character but
without an effective physical presence to fill out one's sense of a
person. A telephone call from a complete stranger provides another
example. 164
The court concluded that allowing Muslim women to testify while
veiled from the judge, jury, and counsel would undermine "the basic values
of the New Zealand type of society" because criminal justice must be
"administered publicly and openly."'' 65  The court feared that an opposite
holding would shake public confidence in the criminal justice system and
bring the court into "disrepute."' 166 However, the court clarified that no one
but the judge, counsel, and court staff had to see the witnesses unveiled, and
suggested using a screen to minimize intrusion. 1
67
163. Id. at*91.
164. Id. at *63.
165. Id. at *88. In its analysis, the court put special emphasis on the importance of demeanor
evidence. Specifically, the court stated:
The look which says "I hoped not to be asked that question," sometimes even a look of
downright hatred at counsel by a witness who obviously senses he is getting trapped, can
be expressive. So too can abrupt changes in mode of speaking, facial expression or body
language. The witness who moves from expressing himself calmly to an excited gabble;
the witness who from speaking clearly with good eye contact becomes hesitant and starts
looking at his feet; the witness who at a particular point becomes flustered and sweaty, all
provide examples of circumstances which, despite cultural and language barriers, convey,
at least in part by his facial expression, a message touching credibility.
Id. at *68-69. The court also focused on the importance of demeanor during cross-examination,
where "tiny signals" from facial expressions guide the questioning. Id. at *71.
166. Id. at *90.
167. Id. at *90-91. Specifically, the judge wrote: "[S]creens may be used to ensure that only
Judge, counsel, and Court staff (the latter being females) are able to observe the witness's face." Id.
at *90. This ruling indicates that the court was more concerned with the jury's ability to use
demeanor and with the defense counsel's ability to cross-examine than with the defendant's ability
to see the witness. Yet, New Zealand is not governed by the Confrontation Clause, and the judge
had no need to consider the specific issue of "face-to-face" confrontation between witness and
defendant.
E. The Unresolved Issue of Veiling and Confrontation in America
While parallels may be drawn from the above precedent to support an
argument for or against unveiling, this specific question raises new and
controversial issues that have not been addressed in an American court of
law. Where before the arguments centered on the physical and mental
protection of witnesses who wish to remain hidden from the defendant, the
argument here involves the protection of a religious practice many Muslim
women consider sacred. In the future, this issue will inevitably require the
attention of American jurisprudence. Utilizing the above discussion of
Islam, the veil, the history of the Confrontation Clause, and its recent
applications, this article will now offer an answer.
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND VEILED WITNESSES IN TRIAL:
WHO WINS?
Although no existing legal authority addresses this specific issue, the
United States Supreme Court has laid down precedent that clearly applies
and guides us to an answer. 168 In Maryland v. Craig,169 the Court crafted a
test that was designed to prevent the unreasonable abridgment of a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him at
trial-the right to call his accusers from the shadows and subject them to the
full protective power of America's adversarial system. 70 Where a Muslim
168. The most significant U.S. Supreme Court cases are Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Although these cases do not address the precise issue at
hand, they are still applicable, and a court handling this issue must apply the law as appropriately as
possible in a case of first impression. See supra notes 98-128 and accompanying text. When faced
with an issue of first impression, a high court's "duty is to adopt the rule of law that is most
persuasive." Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Graham-Gonzales, 107 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2005)(citations omitted). Therefore, the following approach has been suggested:
A court must determine whether law exists on a subject, and when deciding a question
without the guidance of precedent, a court must adopt the rule that is most persuasive, in
light of precedent, reason, and policy, considering local custom, the Restatement view,
legislative intent, or the law in other jurisdictions.
21 C.J.S. Rules of Adjudication, Decisions, and Opinions § 190 (2008). The U.S. Supreme Court
has made it clear that "a court properly asked to construe a law has the constitutional power to
determine whether the law exists." U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508
U.S. 439, 446 (1993).
169. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
170. See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text (examining Craig and analyzing its resulting
rule). The Court explicitly declared, "The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Craig, 497 U.S. at 845 (emphasis
added). After crafting the applicable test for face-to-face confrontation clause issues, the Court
described that test as "serv[ing] the purpose of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence
admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the
norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings." Id. at 846 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 739 (1987)) (emphasis added). Specifically, the test is designed to apply in situations where an
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woman serves as an adverse witness and testifies from behind the veil, a
shadow is cast on that witness and the adversarial process is severely
crippled. 7' This is precisely the situation where the Craig precedent was
designed to apply, and where it must apply.'72 Despite the unfortunate
invasion of religious practice that results, 173 the test clearly points to one
appropriate answer when applied: a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is violated when a
Muslim woman testifies behind a veil.
To support this argument, this section will first address why courts must
apply the Craig analysis to cases that involve the issue at hand. 7 4 Next, this
section will apply the Supreme Court's two-pronged Craig test, analyzing
the issues of reliability and public policy. 75 First Amendment concerns are
discussed in the following part of this Comment. 1
76
accusatory witness speaks against a criminal defendant and there is an absence of "physical, face-to-
face confrontation." Id. at 850.
171. It is for this reason that the New Zealand judge in Police v. Razamjoo described veiled
testimony as "a major departure from accepted process and the values of a free and democratic
society." Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3, *90 (D.C. Jan. 14,
2005). It is also why the Michigan judge faced with a veiled party in small-claims court said, "I
can't see your face and I can't tell whether you're telling me the truth or not and I can't see certain
things about your demeanor and temperament .... " Transcript of Record, supra note 27, at 4. It
was for similar reasons that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to allow a witness to cover
her face, "the most expressive part of the body and something that is traditionally regarded as one of
the most important factors in assessing credibility." Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). It was also for similar reasons that a Florida court of appeals upheld the state's
ban of veils in driver's license photos. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. It is also why
countries such as France, Italy, and Turkey have banned the veil in many public forums. See supra
notes 76-83 and accompanying text. As recognized in Section II of this article, there are many
forms of the Muslim "veil." See supra note 53 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this
argument, the veil referred to here is one that covers a majority of the witness's face. The following
analysis does not address religious headgear that leaves the face uncovered.
172. It is true that in at least one case, a federal court has decided not to apply the Craig analysis
in a "face-to-face" confrontation situation. See Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002).
However, the court in that case "should have . . . held that the Supreme Court's established
confrontation law as set forth in Craig ... did apply." Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 306. Even
still, a veiled witness's testimony brings up even greater concerns than those that arose in Morales,
which further weakens the argument that Craig is not applicable here.
173. See supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Muslim veil and its
meaning. See infra notes 247-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential claims a
veiled witness may try to bring under the First Amendment.
174. See infra notes 177-99 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 200-29 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 247-85 and accompanying text.
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A. The Craig Analysis Is Clearly Applicable
Before discussing the ultimate issue of whether a veiled witness's
testimony violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under Craig, it
first must be established that this is the appropriate test to apply. As the
following discussion shows, the Court's clear use of language in directing
when to apply the test and an examination of the central purposes of the
Confrontation Clause demand that the Craig test be used in the case of a
testifying veiled witness.
The central question raised in Craig was whether exceptions exist to the
Confrontation Clause's guarantee of "face-to-face" confrontation, and this is
where the Supreme Court applied the majority of its analysis. 17 7 The two-
pronged test that resulted from this analysis was designed to determine the
constitutionality of any trial court decision that denies the defendant his or
her literal right to physically confront a witness "face-to-face." 178  As a
result, the Craig test is applicable when an adverse witness testifies against a
criminal defendant in trial and there is an interference with the "face-to-
face" aspect of confrontation with that witness. 179
It has been argued that the Craig Confrontation Clause analysis
guaranteeing literal confrontation is only triggered by the mere lack of
physical presence of the witness, and in no other situations. 180 Under this
argument, as long as the witness is physically placed on the stand in front of
the defendant, the court is free to apply its own test in place of the Craig
177. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990). The Court states the issue precisely as
follows: "[W]hether any exceptions exist' to the irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: 'a right to
meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial."' Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
178. Id. at 850-51. See also infra notes 201-49 and accompanying text.
179. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850-51. In Craig, the interference occurred when a child was placed in
another room and her testimony was broadcasted into the courtroom. Id. at 841. Specifically, the
televised testimony interfered with the "physical presence" element of the reliability prong of the
Craig test. Id. at 851. In the case of the veiled witness, there is also an interference with the
"physical presence" element. See infra notes 185-99. Yet the veil creates even greater
interferences, as it impairs two other elements of the reliability prong: cross-examination and
observation of demeanor. See infra notes 209-29. If the interference of only a single element was
enough to trigger the application of the test in Craig, then the test surely should be applied here.
180. See generally Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002). In Morales, the Second Circuit
argued that the Craig analysis could only apply to situations where a complete "physical[ ]
separa[tion]" exists between the defendant and the witness at trial. Id. at 58. Thus, the court did not
use the Craig analysis when determining whether a witness testifying while wearing dark sunglasses
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 59. It is important to note that the Second
Circuit's review of the applicable law was guided by laws governing habeas corpus. Id. at 58. This
required the court to review the Craig test in terms of whether it was "clearly established law." Id.
Because the court found that Craig did not directly address the issue of whether a disguised witness
violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, it decided that Craig was not "clearly established"
law governing disguised witnesses. Id. at 59. Yet even still, the Morales decision is highly
questionable. For a detailed criticism of Morales, see Goldenschneider, supra note 131 (discussing
the error in the Morales decision for not apply Craig to its analysis).
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analysis. 18  It follows under this rationale that the Craig test cannot apply
unless the witness is physically located outside of the courtroom and of the
presence of the defendant.182  Thus, the argument would be that a veiled
witness's testimony would not be subject to Craig's Confrontation Clause
analysis because that witness sits within the courtroom and in the "view" of
the defendant.
Yet the above argument is in direct contradiction with Craig and its
predecessors. 83 In Craig, the Supreme Court chose to explicitly use and re-
use the phrase "face-to-face confrontation"'1 4 because for more than a
century the Confrontation Clause has been interpreted as guaranteeing the
defendant just that-a "face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact."' 85  The Court in Craig did not limit its analysis-
either expressly or implicitly-to address only situations where the witness's
181. The Morales court reasoned that "none of the cases thus far decided by the Supreme Court
deals with our precise context-a witness testifying in the presence of the defendant and the jury
with a slight disguise that prevents the defendant and the jurors from seeing the witness's eyes."
Morales, 281 F.3d at 58. The court did admit, however, that "[t]here can be no question that the
right of a defendant to confront the witnesses against him has been clearly established in decisions of
the Supreme Court." Id.
182. In Morales the court decided not to apply Craig because the "disguised" witness sat directly
in front of the defendant and therefore was not "physically separated." Id. at 62.
183. The Morales court engaged in an extremely narrow reading of Craig and, as a result,
rendered the Supreme Court's test meaningless. To support its holding that the Supreme Court's
Craig precedent only applies to situations where the defendant and witness are "physically
separated," the court refers to both Coy and Craig for support. Id. at 59-60. Yet in Coy, the witness
was in the same room as the defendant, and the only "physical separation" that existed was a screen.
Id. at 58. The Morales court itself admits that Coy involved a witness that was "permitted to testify
behind a screen that prevented [the witnesses from] seeing the defendant although it allowed him
'dimly' to perceive them." Id. The court still claims that, while a screen may create a physical
separation, a disguise does not. Id. This extremely narrow reading of Craig is unwarranted, and a
cause for great concern:
[A]s interpreted by the Second Circuit, there can be no ... decision regarding witness
disguise [that is] reviewable under the established confrontation law of the Supreme
Court, no matter how gross a violation of a defendant's rights.... [E]ven if [the witness]
had worn a paper bag over her head with holes cut out, the Second Circuit's holding that
no Supreme Court precedent had addressed the "precise context" of Morales would
remain valid.
Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 323. Thus, "[tihe Second Circuit's decision suggests no limits,
even in dicta, to how far [such testimony] might go." Id.
184. In Craig, the majority opinion used the phrase "face-to-face" twenty-eight times. See
generally Craig, 497 U.S. 836. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has been using this phrase for the
last 113 years, beginning with the Mattox case in 1895. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242 (1985) ("compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him").
185. Craig, 497 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added). "There is nothing novel about the proposition that
the Clause embodies a general requirement that a witness face the defendant. We have expressly
said as much, as long ago as 1899." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1024 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
body is physically absent from the courtroom.' 86 Neither does the Court
describe the confrontation right using any such phrases as "physical
confrontation," "in-person confrontation," or "body-to-body confrontation,"
and understandably so.' 7 Such a narrow interpretation strips Craig of its
explicit purpose and meaning. 188 Accordingly, the Court was very explicit
about where the Craig test must apply: testimony "absent a physical, face-
to-face confrontation at trial."'189  Because mere physical presence is not
enough to guarantee this literal "face-to-face" confrontation, it is necessary
to analyze the witness's general appearance in trial to determine if any such
situation arises. 190
It is undeniable that confrontation issues can arise even when the
witness sits directly in front of the defendant, as exemplified by witnesses
who wear masks191 or disguises192 that shield their faces from the
defendant's view. 193 The veiled witness is no exception. The literal "face-
to-face" aspect of confrontation is undoubtedly compromised when a
witness's face is covered to the extent that only a small portion is visible. 194
"Face-to-face" becomes "face-to-veil," and literal confrontation is obscured.
This is exactly where the Craig test was designed to apply in order to
186. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844.
187. Such phrases, in place of "face-to-face," might indicate that mere physical confrontation is
sufficient to satisfy the guarantees of the Confrontation Clause. However, this is a mere hypothetical
posed to prove a point; there is no evidence to show the Court has ever considered the use of such
phrases.
188. Using this "physical separation" interpretation, a witness could take the stand while wearing
a sheet over his entire head and body, and the court would be unable to apply the Craig analysis due
to lack of physical separation. Yet if a witness testified in a separate room via video camera and
every detail of his face was clearly broadcasted into the courtroom over a high-definition television,
the Craig test would apply. The Court surely did not intend this backwards result, which completely
ignores the "face-to-face" aspect of its holding.
189. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (emphasis added).
190. The reliability of demeanor evidence has been questioned by empirical studies, and some
claim the absence of facial observation is harmless. However, this does not change the fact that our
legal system is heavily reliant on demeanor evidence. Plus, this does little to negate the Court's
explicit guarantee of "face-to-face" confrontation.
191. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
193. In fact, a witness who physically covers herself is more damaging to a defendant's right to
"face-to-face" confrontation than other situations the Court has faced, and therefore even more
deserving of protection under the Craig test. For example, the Court in Coy found a violation when
a screen was placed between the defendant and child witness, even where the judge, jury, and
counsel could still see the witness's face. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). In the case of a
veiled witness, no one in the courtroom has the opportunity to see the witness's face. The latter
situation has many more negative impacts on the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, such as the
ability of the jury to evaluate demeanor.
194. This is similar to the disguised witness who testified in Romero, where the Craig test was
used. Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The court emphasized that
the disguise, which covered practically his entire face, "prevented a face-to-face confrontation" and
required the use of the Craig analysis. Id.
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determine whether such an interference with a defendant's right to "face-to-
face" confrontation is justified. 195
The necessity of applying the Craig test to veiled witnesses is even
more obvious when examining the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
96
As noted in Craig, the Confrontation Clause's central concern is to ensure
the reliability of testimony against a defendant by subjecting it to the
adversarial system.' 9' As a result, the Craig test's main focus is on the
assurance of testimony reliability despite a lack of literal "face-to-face"
confrontation. To suggest that the test is inapplicable to a situation where
the witness's face is almost completely covered simply because that witness
is within the "physical presence" of the defendant is to completely ignore the
test's purpose. The Craig test was designed specifically for such instances
where a witness shields himself from the defendant, judge, and jury to the
extent that reliability is in danger. 198 That purpose remains clear whether the
witness is testifying far away from the courtroom through video feed or
twelve feet away under the cover of a veil. In the latter situation, the Court
is not permitted to tolerate such a blatant and direct assault on the
effectiveness of the adversarial system without first invoking the Craig test.
This test is likely the defendant's only method of protecting his right of
confrontation against a veiled witness. Where clear Supreme Court
precedent demands protection, it must be applied vigorously.' 99
B. Applying Craig's Two-Pronged Test
It is thus clear that a veiled woman's testimony in trial interferes with
the defendant's right to physical "face-to-face" confrontation and that the
195. "That the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does not, of course, mean
that it may easily be dispensed with." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990). Thus, the
Craig test assures that the absence of face-to-face confrontation is necessary in order to further
important public policy and that the testimony remains reliable. Id. Unless these requirements are
met, the lack of face-to-face confrontation will not be justified. Id.
196. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause).
197. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845.
198. For example, in Craig, the Supreme Court makes an exception for children who might suffer
trauma from facing their accuser face-to-face but still focuses on "reliability" throughout the
majority of the discussion. Id. The physical "face-to-face" aspect of confrontation could only be
sacrificed if all the other elements appeared. Id.
199. "[T]he Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses,
trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses." Id. at 851 (citations omitted). The Supreme
Court emphasizes that "face-to-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing
the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person." Id. at 846. As a result, the
Court clearly states that "face-to-face confrontation" may not "easily be dispensed with." Id. at 850.
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Craig test applies as a result of that interference.2 ° ° Yet, because the
Supreme Court has determined that this aspect of confrontation is not
absolute, there are limited circumstances in which the Confrontation Clause
will not be violated. 20 ' The Craig test is used to determine whether such a
denial is permissible, and that test applies here just as it would in any
situation where the "face-to-face" aspect of confrontation is denied.20 2
First, the Court will look to see if the testimony remains reliable even
though the veil prevents physical "face-to-face" confrontation.2 3 This
requires an inquiry into whether all the other "elements of confrontation"-
oath, cross-examination, and demeanor-are preserved.2°  If not, the test is
not satisfied and a violation occurs. However, if reliability is found
unimpaired, the Court will move on to the second part of the test, which will
only allow the Muslim witness to wear the veil if it furthers an important
public policy. 205
1. Reliability
Although the Supreme Court split on the issue, the majority of the
Justices in Craig held that the Confrontation Clause's guarantee of reliable
witness testimony may still be guaranteed even without "face-to-face"
confrontation. 20 6  However, the necessary reliability will not be established
unless all of the remaining "elements of confrontation" are met:
a. The Impact of Oath
This element deserves little discussion in this context because the veil
clearly does not prevent a witness from testifying under oath. Thus, the
"seriousness of the matter" and the possibility of the penalty of perjury are
still impressed upon the veiled witness, regardless of the lack of physical
face-to-face appearance.20 7 According to the Court, these effects assist in
200. See supra notes 177-99 and accompanying text.
201. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849-50 ("[W]e cannot say that [face-to-face] confrontation is an
indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's
accusers.").
202. See People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a witness's
"full-face mask" violated defendant's confrontation rights); see also Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d
502 (Tex. Crim App. 2005) (finding that a witness's disguise violated defendant's confrontation
rights).
203. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
204. Id. at 851.
205. Id. at 852.
206. Id. at 851. Justices Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens disagreed with this proposition,
arguing that by making "face-to-face" confrontation a mere "dispensable element," the majority has
re-characterized the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. See id. at 845-46.
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protecting against lies. Therefore, the fulfillment of the oath element weighs
toward reliability. °8
b. Defense Council's Opportunity for Cross-Examination
However, the element of cross-examination cannot be so easily
dismissed. A crucial element of the reliability test is the criminal defense
counsel's ability to engage in cross-examination-the "greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth.,20 9 While many strategies exist in
the execution of cross-examination, legal commentators have identified the
ability to assess a witness's expression and general demeanor as an
important part of the truth finding process in cross-examination. 210  For
example, is the witness comfortable or uncomfortable during questioning?
Does the witness appear hesitant or confident? Is the witness indifferent? Is
he scared? These are a few questions that can help guide counsel in
prodding, cajoling, and prying information from the witness to the benefit of
the accused.21 ' And because the actual process of cross-examination is
instinctive, an ongoing evaluation of the witness is crucial.21 2 One trial
attorney has therefore made the following recommendation:
During an examination, never take your eyes off the witness. Your
eyes will see things that others in the courtroom will not-a sense
of doubt, hesitancy, lack of confidence, or a lie. Let the witness
know that your eyes will rarely leave him; never give him an
opportunity to relax or time to conceal.21
Yet with the veiled witness, the counsel conducting the cross-
examination has no choice about concealment. The defense is helpless to
the fact that all of the assessments recommended above can never be fully
implemented when the witness wears a veil over her face, which has been
208. Yet compared to the other elements, this is the least persuasive indicator of reliability.
209. Id. at 846.
210. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
211. Aron Goldschneider, Choose Your Poison: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis of
Criminal Trial Closure v. Witness Disguise in the Context of Protecting Endangered Witnesses at
Trial, 15 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 25, 55 (2004).
212. Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3, *71 (D.C. Jan. 14,
2005).
213. Jack B. Swerling, "I Can't Believe I Asked That Question": A Look at Cross-Examination
Techniques, 50 S.C. L. REV. 753, 771 (1999) (as quoted in Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 321).
described as "the most expressive part of the body., 2 14 The veil covers up
those "[t]iny signals" revealed in facial expression that indicate "how the
witness. is performing. '2 '5  Thus, the defense counsel's ability to make
crucial "heat of battle" decisions that guide cross-examination is impaired.21 6
Where cross-examination is subject to such impairment, the resulting
testimony surely cannot be considered subject to the "rigorous adversarial
testing" as required by the Craig reliability prong.217
Therefore, when a Muslim woman testifies against a criminal defendant
while wearing the veil, the "cross-examination" element is not preserved in a
manner "functionally equivalent" to physical, face-to-face testimony, as the
test requires. This element must fail.
214. Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
215. Razamjoo, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS at *71.
216. Id. This problem does not exist in cases where a screen or closed circuit television is used to
prevent a witness from seeing the defendant because the defense counsel maintains the ability to
fully view the witness. For example, in Coy the screen may have prevented the defendant from
seeing the child and vice-versa, but the defense counsel was allowed to walk past the screen and talk
to the child face-to-face like in any typical trial. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1026-27 (1988).
Also, in Craig, the television may have prevented the child witness from physically facing the
defendant in trial, but everyone was still able to observe the child's facial expressions, "albeit by
video monitor." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990). Because the defense counsel in both
Coy and Craig were free to utilize the child's expressions to make the necessary split-second
decisions required by cross-examination, no impairment occurred.
217. Id. at 851. An argument might arise that the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth
Amendment only guarantees "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (emphasis added). However, in that context, the Supreme Court
was dealing with the cross-examination of a witness that suffered severe memory loss and was trying
to recount out-of-court statements. Id. at 556. In this regard, the Court held that a witness's memory
loss does not impair the right to cross-examination because "it is sufficient that the defendant has the
opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor
eyesight, and even ... the very fact that he has a bad memory." Id. at 559. Yet when the veil covers
a witness's face, the defense counsel is prevented from even effective cross-examination. Thedefense counsel is severely limited in observing such indicators as lack of care, attentiveness, or
bias, as were still available in Owens. By demanding that the veiled witness reveal her face, thedefense is not arguing for "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent" desired. Id. The defense is arguing to retain an essential component of the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth": face-to-face questioning. Id. (quotations omitted).
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c. The Jury's Evaluation of Demeanor
218
The defendant's life and liberty are in the hands of the jury, for it is the
jury that holds the power to label him as a "criminal." z 9  Under the
Confrontation Clause, the defendant is guaranteed that before this power is
exercised, the jury will at least be permitted to "observe the demeanor 2 0 of
the witness in making [her] statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing [her]
credibility.",22' It is worth emphasizing once again what the Supreme Court
guaranteed over a century ago and still guarantees today:
[An] ... examination.., in which the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief.
222
218. This element is closely related to the cross-examination element, because both involve
reading the witness's facial expressions. While both elements increase testimony reliability, they
accomplish this purpose in different ways. The cross-examination element increases reliability
because the defense counsel has the full opportunity to test and challenge the witness's credibility on
the stand, thereby facilitating proper questioning. The demeanor element increases reliability
because the jury is allowed to fully evaluate the witness's demeanor and use this evaluation to
determine credibility. Overall, the former allows the defense counsel to deliver the jury reliable
testimony, while the latter allows the jury to evaluate the credibility of the testimony.
219. See supra note 2 (discussing the consequences of being labeled a "criminal").
220. Black's Law Dictionary gives the following definition of demeanor: "Outward appearance or
behavior, such as facial expressions, tone of voice, gestures, and the hesitation or readiness to
answer questions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 463 (8th ed. 2004).
221. Craig, 497 U.S. at 846 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). As the
Michigan Court of Appeals once put it, "[D]emeanor is of the utmost importance in the
determination of the credibility of a witness." People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901, 909 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (quoting People v. Dye, 427 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Mich. 1988)). That court continued,
"The innumerable telltale indications which fall from a witness during the course of his examination
are often much more of an indication to judge or jury of his credibility and the reliability of his
evidence than is the literal meaning of his words." Dye, 427 N.W.2d at 505. Recently, empirical
evaluations have been used to suggest that demeanor evidence is unreliable. James P. Timothy,
Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903, 905 (2000). Commentators who support this
argument use various studies to conclude that "demeanor findings based on visual observations are
generally of little use in determining the witness's credibility." Id. at 930. In Morales v. Artuz, these
same studies led the Second Circuit to conclude that reliability should be more grounded on
empirical data, rather than tradition. Goldschneider, supra note 131, at 319. However, as one judge
notes: "The classroom is not the courtroom. The conditions of the psychological experiment do not
have the ceremony, oath, atmosphere, and institutional tradition of a courtroom and do not inspire
the same sincerity." Timothy, supra, at 934-35.
222. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (emphasis added).
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Thus, a crucial part of the reliability guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause
depends on the jury's ability to look at the witness face-to-face and judge his
demeanor.223
The veil impairs the jury's ability to evaluate demeanor as guaranteed
by the Confrontation Clause because it hides the most expressive part of the
body-the face.224 The jury can still evaluate the veiled witness's tone of
voice and possibly her body language,225 and one court has held that these
alternative forms of demeanor are sufficient to ensure reliable testimony.226
But when the veil erases a witness's face from the jury's view, that witness
becomes essentially expressionless, and the alternate forms of demeanor
simply do not sufficiently support reliability. Behind the veil, a witness may
sweat nervously yet maintain perfect composure. She may bite her lip or
grind her teeth to abate her growing anger, but on the outside appear calm.
223. Id.
224. General "demeanor" encompasses more than just facial expressions, such as voice tone and
body language. See Timothy, supra note 221, at 904 n.3. However, most demeanor evidence is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate without the ability to see a witness's face. For
example, demeanor is useful in revealing a witness's surprise, anger, nervousness, disgust,
amusement, boredom, fear, or pain. Id. at 918-21. Other looks cannot be so easily categorized, such
as the look that says, "I hoped not to be asked that question." Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R.
408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS *3, *68-69 (D.C. Jan. 14, 2005). Jurors may get a sense of such
emotions by evaluating body language and tone of voice but will determine these emotions more
confidently and easily through the witness's multitude of facial expressions. In fact, one expert "has
identified . . . 46 facial muscle movements as emblems of the speaker's emotions." Timothy, supra
note 221, at 916 n. 116. To illustrate the range of human emotions through facial expressions,
several researchers in Japan formed a database containing 213 images of 7 facial expressions posed
by 10 models. This collection of photos can be downloaded at
http://www.kasrl.org/jaffe.-download.html. Overall, while other forms of demeanor may exist, none
is more useful than the witness's facial expressions. Covering a witness's face also prevents the jury
from evaluating simple aspects of physical appearance. Timothy, supra note 221, at 907-08. The
following strategy used by renowned defense attorney Clarence Darrow provides a classic example:
The witness was a squat, heavy-set man of medium height .... His swollen face, bleary
eyes, puffy eyelids, and reddish-purple nose marked the habitual drunkard. His shaggy..
• hair had been stranger to brush or comb for so long as to have become tangled and
matted. His clothes ... were covered with dirt and grease. His huge hands ... were
covered with grime. Darrow's cross-examination of the witness consisted only of his
request that the witness stand up and turn around for the jury.
Id.
225. The value of a veiled witness's body language will depend on the extent the veil covers the
body. For example, a burqa is not as restricting as typical clothing because it drapes down over the
body. Such veils may hide subtle body language and further impair the jury's ability to evaluate
demeanor.
226. See Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2002). In Morales, the court allowed a
witness to testify against the defendant in dark sunglasses, and reasoned that the jurors still "had an
entirely unimpaired opportmity to assess the delivery of [the witness's] testimony, notice any
evidence nervousness, and observe her body language." Id. Further, the court concluded that thejury could "combine these fully observable aspects of demeanor with their consideration of the
substance of ... [the] testimony." Id. at 61-62. This is doubtful. Yet even assuming this is a valid
argument, the veil covers much more than sunglasses cover. It nearly covers the entire face,
impairing the jurors' opportunity to make credibility assessments that simply cannot be revealed by
the other forms of demeanor alone.
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She may be smiling, frowning, or stoic, yet the jury will never know. Little
by little these "tiny signals" will slip away unnoticed by the jury, amounting
to testimony that is essentially worthless in terms of reliability. If that
testimony is the only evidence supporting a defendant's conviction, the
denial of these "tiny signals" can lead to immense consequences.
Yet in the situation of a veiled witness, Craig's plain language should
preclude a judge from even addressing the above argument about the
different methods of demeanor evidence. This is because the Court has
interpreted the Confrontation Clause as guaranteeing more than the jury's
opportunity to simply assess demeanor; it literally guarantees that the
227
witness will stand "face to face with the jury" in that assessment. Just as
the veil prevents a physical "face-to-face" meeting between the witness and
defendant, 228 here it prevents the same "face-to-face" meeting between the
witness and the jury. Because the reliability prong cannot be satisfied when
a veiled witness testifies against a criminal defendant, there can be no
exceptions granted, and the veil must be removed. 229 This element also must
fail.
2. Public Policy
For the sake of argument and analysis, 230 if the reliability prong is met
in the case of a veiled witness, the Craig test will proceed to the next
prong.23' The second "critical inquiry" is whether the denial of "face-to-
face" confrontation is "necessary to further an important public policy.
232
227. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (emphasis added).
228. See supra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
229. "[A] defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical,
face-to-face confrontation at trial only where .. . the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (emphasis added).
230. A court would normally not proceed to this step of the analysis because the reliability prong
has not been met. This section analyzes the Public Policy for the purpose of fleshing out more
meaning in this unexplored area of law.
231. Id.
232. Id. "'Public policy' consists of the principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by
the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society." 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Courts § 47 (2004).
There is no principle of judicial restraint that requires courts to refrain from deciding
public policy questions. Public policy is not determined by a court's generalized
concepts of fairness and justice or a determination of what might be most just in a
particular case; courts must look to the Constitution, statutes, and the judicial decisions of
the state to determine public policy. A court may make an alleged public policy the basis
of a judicial decision only in the clearest cases. However, that which is not prohibited by
statute, condemned by judicial decision, or contrary to the public morals contravenes no
865
To answer this question, the Court looks to see if the state's interest is
"sufficiently important to outweigh... a defendant's right to face his or her
accusers." 233  In sum, the denial of "face-to-face" confrontation must be
necessary to further that interest. 234
The state's "interest" at issue here is best described as the protection of
witnesses and their ability to choose where and how they want to practice
their religion.235 Given the prominence of the First Amendment, protecting
a witness's freedom of religion is an important state interest. 236  It would
also appear that allowing veiled testimony is the only possible method of
protecting a witness who wears the veil in trial as a religious obligation,
because the only alternative is unveiling. Thus, in order to further the state's
interest in protecting a witness's religious freedom, it would be necessary for
the state to prevent face-to-face confrontation. Overall, there appears to be a
strong public policy argument. Yet because public policy is so broad, it is
necessary to analyze the bigger consequences of allowing veiled
testimony.237
First, allowing the veil in trial will create a slippery slope that may lead
to the admission of even more troublesome testimony. If a Confrontation
Clause exception is made for the veil because the Muslim woman is
exercising her freedom of religion, what else must the Court make room for?
If a witness enters the courtroom with a sincere belief that he has a religious
obligation to wear a hockey mask in public, will the court also allow it into
principle of public policy.
Id.
233. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853. In Craig, the Court found a valid public policy justification for
removing the face-to-face aspect of confrontation at trial:
We ... conclude today that a State's interest in the physical and psychological well-being
of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court. That a significant majority of States
have enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the trauma of giving testimony in
child abuse cases attests to the widespread belief in the importance of such a public
policy.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022-23 (1987)).
234. Id. at 852.
235. This is essentially a First Amendment argument because it involves the guarantee of free
exercise of religion. As discussed in the next section of this article, the witness's right to practice
her religion by wearing a veil in court must cede to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. Thus, this interest is not sufficient to outweigh the confrontation right.
236. "[T]he First Amendment constitutes an absolute prohibition against governmental regulation
of religious beliefs. Thus, the Supreme Court has said that freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as an individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law." 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 424 (1998).
237. An accepted definition of "public policy" is, "[b]roadly, principles and standards regarded by
the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of
society." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004). "Courts sometimes use the term tojustify their decisions." Id.
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trial? 238  Also, allowing veiled testimony will cause a great appearance of
impropriety,239 which may shake the public's confidence in America's
criminal justice system. 240  Additionally, allowing such veiled testimony
may encourage abuse of the exception to the Confrontation Clause.
Prosecutors could take their most unbelievable witnesses and cover them up
at will. 24' Finally, it is again helpful to look at policy implemented
overseas. 242 Various countries have banned the Muslim veil in many
respects, all for a variety of reasons. In New Zealand specifically, a district
court ruled decisively against veiled testimony.243
Taken altogether, there appears to be a sufficiently important state
interest in protecting veiled witnesses, and preventing the veil from being
removed seems to be necessary to further that interest. Yet many other
public policy factors indicate allowing veiled testimony would have a
detrimental effect. A court would need to engage in an intricate balancing
act to reach a conclusion. As Justice Scalia has expressed, the United States
Constitution "enshrines" certain rights that should not be easily influenced
by public policy. 44 The Court should not be so willing to make an
exception to a fundamental right that has existed since the time of our
forefathers. 245 Fortunately, this specific public policy determination is likely
unnecessary due to the veiled witness's lack of reliability.
238. As ridiculous as this hypothetical may seem, based on the Court's approach to freedom of
religion issues there is cause for concern. "Religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." 16A AM.
JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 424 (1998).
239. "The trial of a case should not only be fair in fact, but it should also appear to be fair. And
where the contrary appears, it shocks the judicial instinct to allow the judgment to stand."
Hernandez v. Paicius, 109 Cal. App. 4th 452, 455 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted).
240. When presented with such a situation in the New Zealand case of Police v. Razamjoo, the
judge said:
Public interest considerations well beyond the scope of rights are relevant. They include
the need to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system. The need for
consistency within that system means that Courts should follow normal and accepted
processes except (where permitted by law) to the extent justified by all the circumstances
of a particular case. The more extreme the departure from normal process the greater the
justification required.
Police v. Razamjoo, [2005] D.C.R. 408, 2005 N.Z.D.C.R. LEXIS.*3, *86 (D.C. Jan. 14, 2005).
241. This, coupled with a court's inability to question a witness's "sincere" religious beliefs,
would create a dangerous situation for the criminal defendant.
242. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (exploring worldwide reaction to the Muslim
veil).
243. See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text (discussing the New Zealand trial ruling that
refused to allow two Muslim women to testify while veiled).
244. See Maryland v. Craig, 487 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. See supra note 86.
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C. Confrontation Clause Violated
As discussed above, when a Muslim woman testifies against a criminal
defendant while wearing a veil, the reliability prong fails. Specifically, the
absence of the elements of cross-examination and the jury's ability to utilize
demeanor evidence is what truly impairs reliability. 246 Because the veiled
witness's testimony cannot be considered reliable, the argument stops there.
However, it has also been emphasized that the public policy argument would
also be questionable.
In sum, a veiled witness simply cannot testify against criminal
defendants without violating their Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
rights. As indicated, this is a just result. The primary goals of the
Confrontation Clause are preserved when the witness is forced to unveil.
Yet the unfortunate fact is that the unveiling will likely be deeply offensive
and humiliating for many Muslim women. The next section addresses
possible claims that veiled witness might bring under the First Amendment.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
The Muslim woman who faces a court order to unveil will likely
demand her own protections under the law. After all, the defendant is not
the only one protected by the United States Constitution.247 In seeking
protection, a Muslim woman may attempt to exercise her First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion. It is not an unreasonable argument,24t and
ultimately the result will depend upon the jurisdiction in which the veiled
witness testifies.249 Yet because the Confrontation Clause is neutral toward
religion and generally applicable to all Americans, the religious practice of
veiling should cede to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
246. In Craig, the Court narrowly agreed by majority that there was reliability, but in that case
only one of the additional "elements of confrontation" was absent. See Craig, 487 U.S. 836. When
there are two elements absent, such as in this situation, the result is very clear: no reliability can be
found.
247. "The Bill of Rights belongs.., to all citizens. It protects them as long as they reside within
the boundaries of our land. It protects them in the exercise of the great individual rights necessary to
a sound political and economic democracy." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 166 (1945). "Only by
zealously guarding the rights of the most humble, the most unorthodox and the most despised among
us can freedom flourish and endure in our land." Id.
248. As Congressman Jerrold Nadler writes, "In the face of religious strife through the world, it is
my hope that Americans understand that religious freedom, as protected by the Bill of Rights, is the
crown jewel of America's experiment in democracy .... We tamper with that freedom at our own
peril." Jerrold Nadler, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments in Public Buildings, 4 No. 15
LAW. J. 7 (2002).
249. The level of protection will depend on whether the case is brought in federal or state court.
Certain states offer more protection for free exercise of religion through special legislation. See
infra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional and state legislation that directly
addresses Free Exercise).
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A. History of Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.250 Generally, the Supreme
Court has interpreted this clause 211 to mean that: "[T]he government is
prohibited from interfering with or attempting to regulate any citizen's
religious beliefs, from coercing a citizen to affirm beliefs repugnant to his or
her religion or conscience, and from directly penalizing or discriminating
against a citizen for holding beliefs contrary to those held by anyone
else."252
However, conflict arises when a religious practice clashes with a
"generally applicable" rule of law.253 History reveals this conflict through
Supreme Court precedent and federal and state legislative action.
Beginning with the first major free exercise cases in the late nineteenth
century and continuing through the first part of the twentieth century, the
Court mostly ruled in favor of secular laws over minority religious
practice.254 Thus, in the landmark case of Reynolds v. United States,255 the
Court held that "while [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
,,256 .ve otne o eae n
opinions, they may with practices. This view continued for decades and
in the majority of cases, religious practices gave way to secular government
laws.257 Starting in 1963, however, the Court began taking a different
250. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The full text of the First Amendment is as follows: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
25 1. This clause is often referred to as the "Free Exercise Clause." See 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.6 (3d ed. 1999). "[This] clause, like all
of the guarantees of the First Amendment, applies to state and local governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. "The free exercise clause was first held applicable to the states in
Cantwell v. Connecticut." Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
252. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 424 (1998) (citing Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp., Pa.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
253. "A person may be unable to comply with a law because his religious beliefs prohibit him
from taking an action that is required by law ... or because his religious beliefs require him to do
something that is prohibited by the law." ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at § 21.6. "These
types of situations raise the question of whether the free exercise clause requires the government to
grant an exemption from a law of general applicability to a person who cannot conform his actions
to the law due to his religious beliefs." Id.
254. McCusker, supra note 11, at 393.
255. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
256. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 at 166. This is a "landmark case" where the Supreme Court upheld
federal law prohibiting polygamy. McCusker, supra note 11, at 393. The law was upheld against a
Mormon who claimed polygamy was his religious duty. Id.
257. McCusker, supra note 11, at 393. However, prior to 1963 the Court found that the First
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approach by adopting a "compelling state interest standard for restrictions on
religious practice. 258 Although this seemed to indicate that the Supreme
Court would give significant protection to religious practice,259 in reality, the
Court ruled in favor of generally applicable laws in almost every case in the
twenty-eight years it applied the "compelling state interest" test. 26°
In 1990, the Supreme Court abandoned the two-part "compelling state
interest" test in the controversial case of Employment Division v. Smith.2 61
The majority held that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the
Amendment required an exemption to be granted from certain types of laws for persons who wanted
to engage in First Amendment activity such as speech or assembly. See id.; see also Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (exempting both religious and nonreligious speakers from certain
types of licensing systems that would have been validly applied to business that did not involve First
Amendment activity); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (prohibiting
government from punishing children who refused to pledge allegiance to the United States flag).
258. Samuel J. Levine, Religious Symbols and Religious Garb in the Courtroom: Personal Values
and Public Judgments, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1506 (1998). Using this standard, "the Court
applied a balancing test to determine whether religious individuals and groups had the right to
exemptions from generally applicable laws." McCusker, supra note 11, at 393. First, the
complainant had to show that "the law at issue interfered with the practice of his religion by
requiring him to engage in a practice (or to refrain from engaging in a practice) in violation of his
religion." ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at § 21.6. Second, "the Court required the
government to demonstrate that granting an exemption to the person whose religious beliefs
prevented compliance with the law would interfere with a [compelling governmental interest.]" Id.
The government could only pass this second step "if the Court determined that the regulation at issue
was tailored to promote an end that was important enough to override the burden on the free exercise
of religion by persons who could not comply with the law." Id.
259. "Court opinions during this era ... read as if the Supreme Court would give significant
protection to religiously motivated actions." Id.; see McCusker, supra note 11, at 393 ("[T]he
Court's jurisprudence took a different turn which seemed-at least in theory-to shift the balance
toward upholding religious practices that conflicted with laws of general applicability.").
260. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at § 21.6. Under the "compelling interest test" the
Court upheld several laws against free exercise challenges. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) (upholding an Air Force policy that prohibited headgear, even though it infringed on the
right of a Jewish officer to wear a yarmulke); see also O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)
(upholding a prison rule that prevented Muslim prisoners from attending their worship service).
However, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court "granted Amish children an exemption
from mandatory school attendance laws." McCusker, supra note 11, at 394 (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). Yoder has been called "the most celebrated case of this period." Id.
261. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Supreme Court found that "a state criminal law that
totally prohibited the use of peyote could be applied to someone who used peyote based on a
sincerely held religious belief that the drug had to be used in a religious ceremony." ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 249, at § 21.6. In the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:
Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the
Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process .... But to say that a
nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable,
is not to say that it is constitutionally required .... It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of religious beliefs.
Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890).
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object of a [law], but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended. ' 262 Thus, the Court explicitly affirmed that the government only
needs to prove a compelling interest when the law targets a specific religion,
and not when authorizing a law of general applicability. 263 This decision
created controversy and as a result many demanded legislative action.264 "In
an attempt to override [the effects] of Smith, Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 .,,265 RFRA accomplished this by
reinstating the "compelling interest" standard test for free exercise. 266 Five
years later the Supreme Court struck down RFRA's application to state laws
by holding that it violated the separation of powers doctrine.267 Yet this did
262. McCusker, supra note 11, at 394 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 878).
263. Id. The Court later wrote:
[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
government interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice .... A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a
compelling govemment interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
264. Many saw the "abandonment of the 'compelling interest' test [as] a weakening of the
protection of free exercise by the Supreme Court." 63 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (2001).
"Groups concerned with that perceived loss of religious liberty urged Congress to take action,"
which later resulted in Congress passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id.
265. 63 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2001). According to Congress, the purpose of RFRA
was to "restore the compelling interest test in those situations where someone's free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened and to provide a claim or defense to those whose free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2000)).
266. McCusker, supra note 11, at 394. RFRA provided that the "Govemment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except.., in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and... [if the law] is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (2000)). This essentially reinstated the law as it existed before Smith.
267. The Court did this in City of Boerne v. Flores, and reasoned that the statute "exceeded
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power by impermissibly expanding the First Amendment
and ... intruding into the states' general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens." McCusker, supra note 11, at 395 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36
(1997)). The Court concluded:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of
the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations
of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted
within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law
is. When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in
later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them
under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be
disappointed. RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one
before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control.
not extinguish RFRA legislation, as the Court has held that it still applies to
federal law.268 Additionally, some states have passed statewide statutes that
offer greater protection than federal law. 26
9
Thus, the result of a free exercise claim depends on jurisdictional rules.
Still, the general rule remains: "[W]hen faced with a conflict between
religious practice and a rule or statute facially neutral toward religion, the
Court's rulings indicate that religious practice must cede to facially neutral
rules., 270  Yet, RFRA in federal cases and similar state statutes in certain
states reflect more protective rules that will result in increased protection of
religious practice. Therefore, the protections afforded to the veiled witness
will depend greatly on the forum.
B. Free Exercise of Religion Applied to Veiled Testimony
Before analyzing any First Amendment free exercise claim, it is
necessary to identify the law that creates the alleged violation.27' In the case
of a woman who is ordered to unveil at trial, the law in question is the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.272 In states that have not passed RFRA
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (citation omitted).
268. The Court recently clarified this point in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Uniao Do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006).
269. McCusker, supra note 11, at 395. The following states have passed what are essentially new
versions of RFRA: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas. Id.; see ALA. CONST. amend.
622; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2005);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (LexisNexis
2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251 (2006); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2401 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-
80.1-3 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2003); TEX. CODE ANN. § 100.003 (Vernon 2004).
270. McCusker, supra note 11, at 391-92 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
271. The questionable law will be the focus of the claim since this is where the alleged violation
arises. In approaching the questionable law, the Court has used a "well established constitutional
principle":
[T]hat [the] government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so
well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions . . . . Our review
confirms that the laws in question were enacted by officials who did not understand,
failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated the
Nation's essential commitment to religious freedom. The challenged laws had an
impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was violated
because the secular ends asserted in defense of the law, were pursued only with respect to
conduct motivated by religious beliefs.
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at § 21.6. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993)).
272. Because most state constitutions mirror the U.S. Constitution's Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause language, the law in question would be the same for state and federal courts.
However, some state constitutions offer more guarantees than the U.S. Constitution. In those cases,
the specific language of the state constitution would be the correct law to examine. See supra note
131 and accompanying text (discussing the Confrontation Clause's applicability to the states and the
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statutes, a Muslim woman who demands First Amendment Free Exercise
protection will be subject to the Smith rule.273 This only requires a court to
look for a compelling state interest if the law targets a specific religion,274
and that is not the case here. Like most constitutional language, the
Confrontation Clause speaks very broadly and refers to any witness,
275
regardless of race, religion, sex, or any other distinguishing language. It is
therefore classified as a "generally applicable law." Under Smith, such a
neutral and generally applicable law does not need to be supported by a
compelling government interest, even if it incidentally burdens a religious
276practice. Unfortunately for the veiled witness, this means that even if the
Confrontation Clause burdens her religion by requiring unveiling, the state
does not need to defend its law. 7
Yet in some situations a Muslim woman will have a stronger Free
Exercise claim due to more favorable laws in certain jurisdictions. In federal
court, the federal RFRA applies and creates a more rigorous standard. 78
The same is true in those states that have passed RFRA statutes. In these
jurisdictions, a Muslim woman would first have to show a substantial
burden 79 on the free exercise of her religion caused by the unveiling.80
Assuming the woman declares to the court that her religion requires her to
different state constitutions).
273. Because the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states, Smith is the
proper standard to apply unless state legislation indicates otherwise. See supra notes 267-68 and
accompanying text (discussing RFRA and its relationship to the states).
274. McCusker, supra note 11, at 394.
275. The Confrontation Clause says that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). See supra
note 84 for the full text of the Sixth Amendment.
276. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
277. The unveiling would be the "incidental effect" of the Confrontation Clause's guarantees, and
thus not offend the First Amendment under Smith. Id. It is likely this type of result that led
Congress to pass RFRA.
278. This standard is more rigorous because it requires a compelling government interest for any
law that infringes on a person's free exercise of religion, even if the law is generally applicable. See
63 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3D 195 § 3 (2001). However, it is interesting that while this standard
was in effect between 1963 and 1989, very few exemptions were made for free exercise. See supra
note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of the "compelling interest"
standard). This seems to indicate that, even with the heightened standard, very few exemptions will
be made.
279. "There would be no free exercise issue in a case if the individual seeking the exemption
could not demonstrate that complying with the law constituted a burden on her religious beliefs."
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at § 21.6. It is possible that this burden may be "direct" or
"indirect." Id. "A law would directly burden a religion by making illegal a religious practice." Id.
"A law that creates an indirect burden is one that does not regulate a religiously motivated
practice,.., but which makes the practice of a person's religion more difficult." Id.
280. Id.
wear the veil, she is likely to meet this burden. This is especially true when
taking into account the existence of Muslim women who go to great lengths
to remain veiled.281 If a veiled witness is successful in showing a substantial
burden,282 the government will then have to demonstrate a "compelling
governmental interest" to require unveiling under the Confrontation Clause
and that the law "is the least restrictive means of furthering [its] interest., 283
The government could easily argue that it has a compelling interest in
unveiling witnesses in criminal trials because it would be protecting the
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. The fact that the Confrontation
Clause dates back to the founding of our country and beyond would bolster
the government's argument.284 Similarly, the government should be able to
show there are not any less restrictive means of furthering the interest.
When a witness wears a veil in trial, the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights are violated, and the only way to solve this problem is by unveiling
the accuser. It may be possible to somehow mitigate the intrusion caused
when the Muslim woman is forced to unveil, 285 but the unveiling must occur
nonetheless. Thus, it is likely the government will have a strong argument
that a Muslim woman's free exercise claim should fail even under a RFRA
statute.
Overall, it is unlikely that a Muslim woman who is forced to unveil at a
criminal trial will have a successful First Amendment argument. This is
mostly due to the fact that the Confrontation Clause is "neutral" toward
religion and generally applicable to all Americans. Further, because the
government will have an arguable compelling interest in protecting the right
of confrontation for its criminal defendants, a Muslim woman's free exercise
may fail even under the stricter RFRA standards. Yet this should not
prevent a court from ignoring the issue altogether. If possible, a procedure
that mitigates the harm caused by the unveiling should be implemented.
VI. MITIGATING THE HARM OF UNVEILING
It is crucial that the American legal system opens its mind to procedures
that will mitigate the intrusion felt by the unveiling witness.286 Great
281. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
282. This will not always be the case. In Florida, a court found no substantial burden on a Muslim
woman when a law required that she take full-face driver's license photos, thus having to remove her
veil. Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006)
283. ROTuNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at § 21.6.
284. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Confrontation
Clause and its importance).
285. See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text (discussing some possible ways to mitigate
the intrusion caused by forcing a Muslim witness to unveil).
286. This is where an understanding of the veiled witness's cultural and religious background is
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difficulty lies in this task of developing solutions to the intrusion, as most
Muslim women who wear the veil during trial simply do not want to be
seen. 287  If America's adversarial system is to operate properly, it is
impossible to fully accommodate the Muslim witness who unveils. This is
because the trier of fact, counsel, and the defendant must see the witness's
face. Keeping this in mind, it is possible for courts to employ similar
procedures used in cases like Craig and Coy in order to limit the intrusion.
Thus, a screen could block the witness from the majority of the courtroom.
Alternatively, the witness could sit in a separate room and have her video
testimony broadcasted on a television that only certain people in the
courtroom could see.
There are also possibilities beyond Craig and Coy. For example, the
judge could order the audience out of the courtroom on the day the Muslim
woman gives her testimony. This would also involve restricting court
reporters and any type of sketch artists. Also, the judge may permit a
Muslim woman to bring down only the necessary portions of the veil, so that
that rest of her body stays as covered up as possible. Another possibility is
for the judge to monitor how much the veiled witness's testimony is being
used by the prosecution in trial, and limit it as much as possible. This would
prevent the excessive intrusion that would occur if the unveiled witness were
compelled to sit on the stand for an unnecessary amount of time.
Additionally, the judge could arrange special seating in the courtroom so
that the unveiled witness can only be seen by the relevant parties.
Admittedly, the above solutions do not remove the core of the intrusion,
as the witness is still being forced to unveil against her religion. At the very
least, judges and counsel should be sensitive of the impact the Confrontation
Clause may have on Muslim women who view veiling as a religious
obligation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause is designed to protect people like Brian
Taylor,28' and that protection cannot be taken lightly.289 While remaining
extremely helpful. See supra notes 26-83 and accompanying text (generally discussing Islam and
the veil).
287. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note I and accompanying text.
289. "The purpose of enshrining this protection in the Constitution was to assure that none of the
many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could overcome a defendant's right
to face his or her accusers in court." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
sensitive to those women who are trying to exercise their deeply held
religious beliefs, we cannot forget what the Supreme Court has construed the
Confrontation Clause to clearly guarantee: a witness cannot "hide behind the
shadow" and should be compelled to "look [the defendant] in the eye while
giving accusatory testimony. ', 290
The veil creates such a shadow, and it threatens the very nature of our
adversarial system. When we begin allowing certain exceptions to apply to
our fundamental and deeply rooted values, the fabric of our country begins
to unravel. We cannot forget that while our country and laws promote
acceptance, tolerance, and fairness, there are points where we must stand our
ground.29' The Confrontation Clause is one of those grounds where we
should budge very little.292 If we become too careless, we risk destroying
the integrity of our legal system.293 When life and liberty are on the line,
this is unacceptable.
The debate presented in this article is more than a simple intellectual
exercise.294 American courts must be prepared to face the veiled witness
because the issue will eventually arise. Thousands of Muslims continue to
enter our borders and integrate themselves into our society, 295 and the veil
continues to be a part of that integration.296 The increasing "flattening" of
our world today297 and America's involvement in the development of the
Middle East only further the importance of the issue. We cannot simply
isolate ourselves from the rest of the world, especially when it comes to
fundamental beliefs.
290. Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1018 (1988)).
291. As Justice Scalia emphasized in Coy, "face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false
accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020(1988). In order to respect the religion of one group, would we deny the ability to "confound and
undo [a] false accuser" to any criminal defendant who happens to face a Muslim accuser? Keeping
in the mind the Constitution's explicit guarantees and our nation's heavy emphasis on the right of
confrontation, we must favor the criminal defendant. "It is a truism that constitutional protections
have costs." Id.
292. It is for this very reason that the U.S. Supreme Court laid out such a strict test in Craig.
293. "For good or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, and we are not at liberty to
ignore it." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 870 (1990).
294. The value, meaning, and originality of law review articles have been attacked for being
"overstated." See generally E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Law Review's Empire, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 859(1988). As one critic writes, "The dearth of originality in student notes should not be surprising.
The student is permitted to say practically nothing that has not been said before. He must prove that
it was not his idea by dropping a footnote citing the source that already said it." Id. at 909-10.
295. "In 2005, more people from Muslim countries became legal permanent U.S.
residents... than in any year in the previous two decades." Elliott, supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
296. See id.
297. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005).
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As Muslims continue to join America's ranks, our laws must welcome
them. 298  Yet while America must embrace diversity, its fundamental laws
must not become lost in the sea of change. As the United States Supreme
Court reminds us:
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent
succession. Each generation must learn anew that the
Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must
survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to
retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of
all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to define the
freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise
of liberty. 
299
In upholding this covenant, we must continue to protect the liberty of
America's criminal defendants. We must confront the shadow.
Steven R. Houchin
30 0
298. As one author argues, "[A]n increasing number of cases will emerge in coming decades in
which the religious practices of major religions will come into more 'accidental' contact with
ancillary aspects of law and that these conflicts risk causing religious organizations and people to opt
out of public life, thereby threatening democratic participation." McCusker, supra note 11, at 392.
299. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
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